THE FAIR USE OF FREE BROADCAST
TELEVISION: THE BETAMAX CASE AND
THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN
MARKETABLE AND DISPOSABLE
SOFTWARE
Lex citius tolerare vult privatum damnum quam publicum malum*

The dichotomy between law and equity lies at the foundation of
Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence. Law, it is said, commands and is rigid.'
Equity is flexible and delights in justice.2
Law, in the legislative sense, looks to the future; nevertheless, the
perceptions that underlie a legislature's enactments necessarily depend
upon the experiences of the past. It is inevitable, then, that legislatures,
* The law would rather tolerate a private loss than a public evil. BALLENTINE'S

729 (3d ed. 1969); cf Berlin v. E.C. Publications, 329 F.2d 541, 544
(2d Cir. 1964) (courts must occasionally subordinate copyright holder's interest in maximum financial return to public interest in development of art, science, and industry).
I See Wihtol v. Crow, 309 F.2d 777, 781 (8th Cir. 1962) (applicable law purely statutory; 1909 Copyright Act has little elasticity or flexibility). But see 1976 Copyright Act,
Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-118 (1982)
(revising 1909 Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 60-349, 35 Stat. 1075, amended by 1947 Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 80-281, 61 Stat. 652); imfra notes 93 & 94 and accompanying text.
2 Equity "is a mitigating principle by the application of which substantial justice
may be attained in particular cases wherein the prescribed or customary forms of law
seem to be inadequate." BALLENTINE'S LAw DICTIONARY 412 (3d ed. 1969).
The conflict between law of universal application and individual justice has been a
part of Western thought long before the King's Chancellor.
The reason is that all law is universal but about some things it is not possible
to make a universal statement which shall be correct. In those cases, then, in
which it is necessary to speak universally, but not possible to do so correctly,
the law takes the usual case, though it is not ignorant of the possibility of
error. And it is none the less correct; for the error is not in the law nor in the
legislator but in the nature of the thing, since the matter of practical affairs
is of this kind from the start. When the law speaks universally, then, and a
case arises on it which is not covered by the universal statement, then it is
right, where the legislator fails us and has erred by over-simplicity, to correct
the omission--to say what the legislator himself would have said had he
been present, and would have put into his law if he had known. Hence the
equitable is just, and better than one kind of justice-not better than absolute justice but better than the error that arises from the absoluteness of the
statement. And this is the nature of the equitable, a correction of law where
it is defective owing to its universality.
ARISTOTLE, ETHICA NICOMACHEA, bk. V, ch. 10, at 1137b.
3 Lex defuturo;jdex de praeten'o. The law provides for the future; the judge for the
past. BALLENTINE'S LAW DICTIONARY 730 (3d ed. 1969); cf. M. McLUHAN & Q. FIORE,
THE MEDIUM IS THE MASSAGE: AN INVENTORY OF EFFECTS 74-75 (1967) (picture of
man driving automobile with stagecoach in rearview mirror).
LAW DICTIONARY
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mindful of the law's rigidity and faced with myriad problems in a
changing world, often fail to deal with pressing concerns.
In the best scenario, laws that misperceive future needs and conflicts fade quietly into obscurity, the future gems of legal trivialists. In
the worst scenario, when technological or societal changes disrupt the
status quo assumed by the static law, the law that seems to apply may
only apply injustice. The extent to which judges, faced with legal
anachronisms, may utilize the flexibility of equity and the principles of
fairness to alleviate the inadequacies of incomplete or outmoded laws is
a basic and recurrent tension in the law.4 Sony Corp. v. Universal Cty
Studi'os,5 decided last term by the United States Supreme Court, demonstrates that the law of copyright is no exception.
In 1975 the Sony Corporation began marketing the Betamax,6 a
video tape recorder (VTR) designed specifically for the home. 7 Although capable of numerous uses, the machines are primarily used for
4 See supra note 2.
5 104 S. Ct. 774, reh'g denied,
6 See Universal City Studios

104 S. Ct. 1619 (1984).
v. Sony Corp. II, 480 F. Supp. 429, 436 (C.D. Cal.
1979), rev'd, 659 F.2d 963 (9th Cir. 1981), rev'd, 104 S. Ct. 774, reh'gdentid,104 S. Ct. 1619
(1984).
7 The Betamax is one example from the generic category, video tape recorder
(VTR). More specifically, it is a video cassette recorder (VCR) utilizing one-half inch
video tape enclosed in a protective plastic housing or cassette. Sony and those companies licensed by it employ the cassette design, loading, and drive system of the "Beta"
format. Other types of VTR include one inch or wider open-reel and three-quarter inch
U-matic machines. While these latter types were designed for professional and industrial applications, the relatively small, convenient half-inch cassette was developed for
use by the unsophisticated consumer. SONY CONSUMER PRODUCTS CO., INSIDE GUIDE
TO BETAMAX VCR 3 (1984) (promotional literature distributed by retail Betamax dealers) [hereinafter cited as INSIDE GUIDE].
The videotaping of broadcasts preceded the introduction of the Betamax. Universal City Studios v. Sony Corp. II, 480 F. Supp. 429, 435, 436 (C.D. Cal. 1979), rev'd, 659
F.2d 963 (9th Cir. 1981), rev'd, 104 S. Ct. 774, reh'g dented, 104 S. Ct. 1619 (1984). The
district court heard testimony that videophiles, or video enthusiasts, previously had assembled primitive Betamaxes using professional video equipment. Id. at 437.
Ironically, Sony has lost most of the home VCR market to a rival half-inch cassette
format marketed by Matsushita Electric called VHS, or "Video Home System." Additionally, recent advancements in recording technology may challenge the supremacy of
both current home-use formats. In January 1984, Kodak, among others, introduced a
new smaller format using eight millimeter tape. Matsushita also has developed a
smaller format based on the VHS system called VHS-C. Moreover, the wedding of laser
and digital technologies and similar advancements promise to minimize or eliminate the
use of magnetic tape for analog reproduction. See generally TV Sets of the Future, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 6, 1984, at 56 (discussing utilization of digital technology).
The Betamax itself is comprised of four separate electronic components built on a
single chassis: a tuner, a timer, a player/recorder deck, and a radio frequency (RF)
converter. See Sony, 104 S. Ct. at 778-79. The tuner is of the type found in any conventional television. It receives UHF or VHF radio frequencies via antenna and converts
them to audio-video signals. Id at 778. Many newer models are also capable of tuning
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off-the-air recording of television broadcasts.' The Betamax and similar
devices were immediately successful, and sales have continued to
9
increase.
Soon after the introduction of the Betamax, Universal City Studios
and Walt Disney Productions brought suit in the United States District
Court for the Central District of California against the machine's manufacturer, Sony Corporation of Japan (Sony); its wholly-owned United
States distributor, Sony Corporation of America; four retailers of the
Betamax; Sony's consumer products advertising agency; and an indimost, or all, frequencies broadcast via cable. SONY CORP., STEREO VIDEO CASSETTE
RECORDER SL-2710 12 (1983) (owner's manual).
The timer is of the type found in an alarm clock or oven. It will turn the unit on or
off to record a broadcast at a specified time. Newer models employing microprocessors
and electronic tuners are capable of recording numerous programs on any combination
of channels over a period of weeks. This process when utilized to delay viewing is commonly known as "time-shifting." Sony, 104 S. Ct. at 779.
When recording, the deck "writes" the tuner's audio-video signals onto the cassette's magnetic tape for later viewing. When playing back, the deck "reads" these signals off the tape for viewing on TV. Its controls are identical to any audio recorder:
fast-forward, rewind, pause, stop, record, and play. See id. The pause button may be
used to eliminate unwanted segments. Newer machines with "scan" will maintain a
viewable picture during fast-forward or rewind. Id. Both of these features were particularly worrisome to the entertainment industry. Plaintiffs alleged that Betamax owners
would use the scan feature to bypass commercials recorded during time-shifting. If the
viewer were present, the pause button could be used to eliminate commercials from the
original recording. Plaintiffs feared that the elimination of commercials through either
process would substantially reduce advertising revenues. Sony, 480 F. Supp. at 468.
The deck will also record sources other than broadcast television. Most decks have
audio-video inputs and outputs for interfacing with other hardware. Plaintiffs did not
object to recorders per se, but rather the combination of recorder, tuner, and timer on
one chassis. Id at 435.
The RF converter transforms the audio-video signal of the prerecorded tape back to
radio signals so that tapes can be viewed on a conventional television. Id.
By combining these four components, Sony devised one machine capable of numerous uses. These uses include playing back of prerecorded tapes, recording off-the-air
whether the viewer is present or not, recording of "home movies" via a video camera,
and duplicating prerecorded tapes or discs.
8 Sony, 104 S. Ct. at 815 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
9 Since 1975 VCR sales have grown steadily, N.Y. Times, Feb. 12, 1984, § 2, at 30,
col. 3 ("the end of the boom is nowhere in sight"), with 1983 showing a doubling of 1982
sales figures. SIGHT & SOUND MARKETING, Oct. 1983, at 6. The machine's appeal
derives from its unique combination, miniaturization, and simplification of existing
technology. See generally The Video Revolution, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 6, 1984, at 50. See supra
note 7. Although video recording off-the-air was possible before, the Betamax was the
first affordable, easy-to-use VCR. Universal City Studios v. Sony Corp. II, 480 F. Supp.
429, 459 (C.D. Cal. 1979), rev'd, 659 F.2d 963 (9th Cir. 1981), rev'd, 104 S. Ct. 774, reh'g
denied, 104 S. Ct. 1619 (1984). See generally Comment, Home Videorecording." Fair Use or
Infringement?, 52 S. CAL. L. REV. 573, 574-78 (1979) (tracing growth of VTR market);
The Video Revolution, supra, at 52 (correlating decreased import price with increased VCR
sales).
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vidual Betamax owner.'" The gravamen of the complaint was copyright infringement."
The plaintiffs, producers and purveyors of
copyrighted audio-visual works, alleged that individual Betamax
owners used their machines to copy plaintiffs' copyrighted works offthe-air without their permission.12
Universal sought no relief against the individual owner; rather, it
sought to hold Sony liable as a direct or contributory infringer.'" In the
alternative, the plaintiffs contended that Sony should have been held
vicariously liable because Sony had permitted and profited from acts of
14
the direct infringement committed by the individual Betamax owners.
To remedy the alleged infringement, Universal sought monetary dam10 Universal City Studios v. Sony Corp., 659 F.2d 963 (9th Cir. 1981), rev'd, 104 S. Ct.
774, reh'g denied, 104 S. Ct. 1619 (1984). The defendants are referred to herein collectively as Sony.
11 Universal asserted claims under § 1125(a) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 10511127 (1982), and alleged violation of both state and Federal unfair competition laws as
well as intentional interference with contractual and prospective business relations.
Universal City Studios v. Sony Corp. I, 429 F. Supp. 407, 408 (C.D. Cal. 1977). The
Lanham Act claims were dismissed on summary judgment by the trial court. Id. at 411.
In the trial on the merits, the court ruled against Universal on the remaining claims.
Universal City Studios v. Sony Corp. II, 480 F. Supp. 429, 433 (C.D. Cal. 1979), vacated
and remanded, 659 F.2d 963 (9th Cir. 1981), rev'd on other grounds, 104 S. Ct. 774, reh"g denied,
104 S. Ct. 1619 (1984). These claims were not before the Supreme Court. Sony, 104 S.
Ct. at 777 n. 1. The viability of the state unfair competition claims is called into question
by virtue of the specific preemption language of the copyright statute. See 17 U.S.C.
§ 301 (1982). See generally Note, Copyright Preemption.-Eecting the Analysts Prescribedby Section 301, 24 B.C.L. REV. 963 (1983).
12 Sony, 104 S. Ct. at 777. Section 106 of the 1976 Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. §§ 101118 (1982), grants the owner of a copyright
[slubject to sections 107 through 118 . . .the exclusive rights to do and to
authorize any of the following:
(1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords;
(2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work;
(3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the
public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or
lending;
(4) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic
works, pantomimes, and motion pictures and other audiovisual works,
to perform the copyrighted work publicly; and
(5) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic
works, pantomimes, and pictoral, graphic, or sculptured works, including the individual images of a motion picture or other audiovisual
work, to display the copyrighted work publicly.
17 U.S.C. § 106 (1982).
13 Sony, 104 S. Ct. at 777. The 1976 Copyright Act does not expressly provide a cause
of action for infringement committed by a third party. Id. at 785. But see Nimmer,
Copyright Liabilityfor Audo Home Recordings. Dispelhng the Betamax Myth, 68 VA. L. REV.
1505, 1526 (1982) (§ 106 use of phrase "to authorize" intended to avoid question as to
liability of contributory infringers) (quoting H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.
61, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 5659, 5674).
14 Universal City Studios v. Sony Corp. II, 480 F. Supp. 429, 432 (C.D. Cal. 1979),
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ages, an equitable accounting of profits, and an injunction to halt the
sale of the Betamax. 15 Sony answered that non-commercial home videotaping was not an infringement; and that even if it were, no applicable
theory justified holding Sony liable for the direct infringement of the
16
plaintiffs' works by others.
After a five week trial, the district court denied all relief and entered judgment for Sony. 7 Judge Ferguson found implied in the legislative history of the 1976 Copyright Act' and amendments to the 1909
Act 9 a congressional intent to exempt home recording from the copyright scheme.2" More directly, the court held that as a matter of law the
doctrine of fair use 2 1 precluded the extension of the copyright monoply
to prevent the private non-commercial recording of free television.2 2
The court further found that even if such recording were an actionable
infringement, under the facts adduced at trial Sony would not be liable
under any of the three proffered theories.2 3
On all three issues, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals unanimously reversed. 4 Judge Kilkenney, writing for the court, determined
that the district court had erred in finding an implied exemption in the
Copyright Act for home recording of audio-visual works.2 5 Turning to
the issue of fair use, the court declared that the doctrine was designed to
protect the scholar and the critic who excerpt from copyrighted works to
add to society's store of knowledge, 26 rather than to protect the "ordinary" user who appropriates the whole of a copyrighted work for its
reo'd, 659 F.2d 963 (9th Cir. 1981), reo'd, 104 S. Ct. 774, reh'g denied, 104 S. Ct. 1619

(1984).
15 Sony, 104 S.

Ct. at 777.
16 See Universal City Studios v. Sony Corp. II, 480 F. Supp. 429, 459 (C.D. Cal.
1979), reo'd,659 F.2d 963 (9th Cir. 1981), rev'd, 104 S. Ct. 774, reh'g denied, 104 S. Ct. 1619
(1984).
17 Id. at 432-33.
18 Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified at 17 U.S.C.

§§ 101-810 (1982)).
19 Copyright Act of 1909, Pub. L. No. 60-349, 35 Stat. 1075 (current version at 17
U.S.C. §§ 101-118 (1982)).
20 Universal City Studios v. Sony Corp. II, 480 F. Supp. 429, 446 (C.D. Cal. 1979),
rev'd, 659 F.2d 963 (9th Cir. 1981), rev'd, 104 S. Ct. 774, reh'g dented, 104 S. Ct. 1619
(1984).
21 See 'nfra note 37 and accompanying text.
22 Universal City Studios v. Sony Corp. II, 480 F. Supp. 429, 456 (C.D. Cal. 1979),
rev'd, 659 F.2d 963 (9th Cir. 1981), rev'd, 104 S. Ct. 774, reh'd denied, 104 S. Ct. 1619
(1984).
23 Id. at 433.
24 Universal City Studios v. Sony Corp., 659 F.2d 963, 977 (9th Cir. 1981), rev'd, 104
S. Ct. 774, reh'g denied, 104 S. Ct. 1619 (1984).
25 Id at 966.
26 Id. at 972; accordWilliams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 487 F.2d 1345 (Ct. Cl.
1973), af'dby an equally divided Court, 420 U.S. 376 (1975) (per curiam); Rosemont Enters.
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intrinsic value alone.2 7 Finally, the court concluded that Sony's contribution to the infringing activities of individual Betamax owners was sufficient to hold Sony liable.2 8
On certiorari, the United States Supreme Court reversed. Denominating the Betamax a staple item of commerce, the Court held that no
liability could attach to the sale of copying equipment capable of substantial non-infringing uses where the plaintiffs had failed to show more
than minimal harm to the value of their copyrights.2 9
Congressional power to define the scope of the copyright monoply
derives from the express constitutional grant of article I, section 8:
The Congress shall have Power . . . [t]o promote the Progress of

Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors
the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
and Inventors
30
Discoveries.

Although copyright has been viewed as a natural right, 31 the Supreme
Court has held that copyright protection afforded to authors is purely
statutory. 32 Following the scheme first adopted in England by the StatInc. v. Random House, 366 F.2d 303 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1009 (1967);
Time Inc. v. Bernard Geis Assocs., 293 F. Supp. 130 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
27 Universal City Studios v. Sony Corp., 659 F.2d 963, 971-72 (9th Cir. 1981), rev'd,
104 S. Ct. 774, reh'g dentied, 104 S. Ct. 1619 (1984). The court observed that the 1976
Copyright Act provided an illustrative, not limitative, list of productive uses. See infa
note 94. The court distinguished productive use from ordinary use, i.e., reproduction of
a work for its intrinsic purpose. Sony, 659 F.2d at 970. The court further noted that,
historically, fair use " 'has always had to do with the use by a second author ofafirst author's work
. . . for its intrinsic purpose.' " Id. (quoting L. SELTZER, EXEMPTIONS AND FAIR USE IN

24 (1978) (emphasis in original)); cf Jartech, Inc. v. Clancy, 666 F.2d 403,
407 (9th Cir. 1982) (use held to be fair where defendants made abbreviated copies of
film for use as evidence in nuisance abatement trial).
28 Universal City Studios v. Sony Corp., 659 F.2d 963, 976 (9th Cir. 1981), rev'd, 104
S. Ct. 774, reh'g dened, 104 S. Ct. 1619 (1984).
29 Sony, 104 S. Ct. at 796.
30 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
COPYRIGHT

31 Authors in Europe are afforded protection against mutilation, alteration, or distortion of the artistic integrity of their work under the concept of droit moral Rather than a
proprietary right, this theory extends a personal, moral right to the author to have his
work attributed to him in the form in which he created it. See 2 M. NIMMER, NIMMER
ON COPYRIGHT, § 8.21 (1983).
32 Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591 (1834). Under the 1976 Act, copyright
protection begins when "original works of authorship [are] fixed in any tangible medium
of expression, now known or later developed, from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device." 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1982). The 1976 Act approaches but falls short of the droit moral
concept, see supra note 31, by affording legal protection coterminously with artistic crea-

tion. This marked a continued progression in the law of copyright. Previous acts did
not protect an author where he failed to comply with the technical requirements of the
statute. Cf Gilliam v. American Broadcasting Cos., 538 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1976) (granting
cause of action under trademark statute for impairing integrity of author's work, noting
that copyright statute does not presently recognize moral rights). See generally Gottlieb &
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ute of Anne, 33 congressional copyright acts have established a certain
quid pro quo. The author is granted the exclusive right to exploit an
artistic expression in the marketplace. 34 In exchange, the copyright monopoly is limited to a term of years, at the end of which the work is
automatically dedicated to the public domain. 35 The system is one of
mutual benefit: artists receive the economic incentive to create, while
society expands its collective historical and cultural base.
While the copyright statutes and the Constitution speak of an author's bundle of "exclusive" rights, at least one factor militates against a
literal interpretation of the law. Monopolies, as a rule, are disfavored at
law. If an artist denies access to his work altogether, the essential purpose of copyright law-the dissemination of expression-is frustrated.
Likewise, if the access price is too high, art and information become the
exclusive tools of the wealthy, a result abhorrent to democratic ideals.
In either case, restricting access stifles the creativity of others, a result
antithetical to the copyright scheme.
In response to these concerns, an exception was judicially created to
permit, in certain limited circumstances, the unauthorized use of copyrighted materials.36 That exception, the doctrine of fair use, has been
characterized as an "equitable rule of reason," defying precise definition, to be applied according to the facts and circumstances of each
case.

37

Cooper, Copyright Notice, Deposit andRegistration UnderS 22, in THE COMPLETE GUIDE TO
THE NEW COPYRIGHT LAW 75, 80 (1977).
California has enacted legislation that grants a cause of action to the creator of a
work of fine art upon the physical alteration or destruction of that art on the basis that
the creation is "an expression of the artist's personality." CAL. CIVIL CODE § 987(a), (c)
(1982). As such, alteration or destruction would be "detrimental to the artist's reputation." Id § 987(a).
33 8 Anne, ch. 19 (1710).
34 See supra note 12.
35 17 U.S.C. §§ 302-304 (1982); see Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954) (copy-

right statute advances public welfare through encouragement of individual efforts); Berlin v. E.C. Publications, 329 F.2d 541, 543-44 (2d Cir. 1964) (financial reward to
copyright holder incidental to general objective to promote useful arts rather than end
in itself); Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic Analysis of the
Betamax Case and its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1600, 1602 (1982).
36 See, e.g., Rosemont Enters. v. Random House, 366 F.2d 303 (2d Cir. 1966), cert.
denied,385 U.S. 1009 (1967); Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4,
901); Time Inc. v. Bernard Geis Assocs., 293 F. Supp. 130 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
37 Sony, 104 S. Ct. at 792 & n.31 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.
47, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG & AD. NEWS 5659, 5680 [hereinafter cited as
House Report]); see S. REP. No. 983, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 116 (1974); see also Meeropol v.
Nizer, 560 F.2d 1061, 1068 (2d Cir. 1977) (fair use cannot be determined by arbitrary
rules or fixed criteria); Eisenschiml v. Fawcett Publications, 246 F.2d 598, 604 (7th Cir.

1957) (fair use question of fact); Matthews Conveyor Co. v. Palmer-Bee Co., 135 F.2d
73, 85 (6th Cir. 1943) (fair use determined on all the evidence); Public Affairs Assocs. v.
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The defense of fair use is practically as old as copyright protection
itself. It was first recognized as part of American law in 1841, in the case
of Folsom v. Marsh.3 8 Folsom had printed The Writings of George Washington, a duly copyrighted twelve volume annotated collection of our first
President's private letters. 9 The defendant Upham's subsequent two
volume biography of Washington, published by Marsh, contained over
three hundred pages copied verbatim from Folsom's set.4" The defendants claimed that "[a]n author ha[d] a right to quote, select, extract or
abridge from another, in the composition of a work essentially new."'"
Justice Story agreed that a critic, for example, could excerpt from
an original work for the purposes of "fair and reasonable criticism." 42
On the other hand, he noted that a taking so substantial as to render the
original work valueless could not be a justifiable use.4 3 In deciding
whether a use was fair, Justice Story declared, a court should "look to
the nature and objects of the selections made, the quantity and value of
the materials used, and the degree to which the use may prejudice the
sale, or diminish the profits, or supercede the objects, of the original
work." 44 Looking to the facts before him, Justice Story concluded that
and central to the value of the origiUpham's taking was too extensive
45
nal to be considered fair.
Justice Story's fair use theory, embodying the concept that a second
author could build on but not destroy the marketability of the first author's work, conferred on scholars and critics a preferred status under
the law of copyright. The concept of fair use was conceived in the preRickover, 268 F. Supp. 444, 450 (D.D.C. 1967) (finding of fair use depends upon particular circumstances).
38 9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4,901). Since the issue was new to American courts, Justice Story's opinion quotes extensively from English precedent. See id at
348 (citing Saunders v. Smith, 40 Eng. Rep. 1100 (1838); Wilkins v. Aiken, 34 Eng. Rep.
163 (1810); Roworth v. Wilkes, 10 Rev. Rep. 642 (1807)).
39

Id.at 343.

40 Id.
41 Id at 344.
42 Id.
43 Id.at 348; accord Lawrence v. Dana, 15 F. Cas. 26, 60 (C.C.D.Mass. 1869) (No. 8,
136); 3 M. NIMMER, supra note 31, § 13.05 [A] [4], at 13-65. Professor Seltzer contends
that the Folsom test properly focuses on the first author's economic expectation as the
central concern in determining fair use cases. See L. SELTZER, supra note 24, at 32-33.
Not all courts have reasoned from that premise. See, e.g., Rosemont Enters. v. Random
House, 366 F.2d 303, 310 (2d Cir. 1966) (economic harm considered after evaluation of
other factors), cert. dened, 385 U.S. 1009 (1967). See generally Gordon, supra note 35, at
1604 (discussing ambiguities in application of fair use factors).
44 Folsom, 9 F. Cas. at 348. Justice Story's test has been appropriated wholesale into
modern copyright law with some semantic, but little substantive, change. Set infra note
94 and accompanying text.
45 Folsom, 9 F. Cas. at 349.
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industrial, pre-electronic age, at a time when information was disseminated either verbally or through the printed word. In an informational
universe limited by inefficient distribution, illiteracy, and disinterest,
scholars and critics were important pillars in achieving the goal of increasing the availability of ideas and expression. In essence, to the extent that a first author's book sales were not hurt, scholars and critics
were free to contribute to the Enlightenment. The combination of electronics and widespread literacy-the so-called information age-has
spawned the opposite problem. In today's multi-media marketplace,
the way in which an idea is expressed may be as important as its content
in balancing the equities in a particular case. Thus, a magazine article
is made into a book and the book becomes the basis for a film. Each
form of expression is a potentially lucrative property.
Since the introduction of the fair use doctrine into American law,
its viability as a defense in the context of changing market conditions
has been a function both of its adaptability and flexibility as a form of
equity." The extent to which equitable considerations outside the
traditional boundaries of scholarship and criticism might serve to protect the unauthorized use of copyrighted materials in a more modern
setting is demonstrated by Rosemont Enterprises v. Random House.4 7
In 1966, the defendant Random House published a biography of
the eccentric millionaire, Howard Hughes.48 The author of the biography had copied directly from articles that appeared twelve years earlier
in Look Magazine.4 9 Operatives of Hughes had organized Rosemont Enterprises in 1965, ostensibly to commission an "official" biography. 50 In
early 1966, having obtained a proof of the Random House book,
Rosemont purchased the copyright to the Look articles.5 Five days
later, Rosemont brought suit to enjoin the sale of the Random House
biography. 5 The Federal district court granted the injunction, holding
that the use of copyrighted materials for commercial gain could never
be a fair use.53
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed, holding that
46 The list of potentially productive users has expanded in response to the growth of
the social sciences, specialized industries, and the general availability of information.
See, e.g., Wainwright Sec. v. Wall St. Transcript Corp., 558 F.2d 91, 94 (2d Cir. 1977),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1014 (1978).
47 366 F.2d 303 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1009 (1967).
48

Id. at 304.

49 Id.
50

Id. at 305.

51 Id.
52

Id.

53

Id at 304.
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a profit motive alone was not a bar to the defense of fair use.54 More
important was whether a finding of fair use served "the public interest."' 55 Look, it appeared, had not objected to the biography's publication, while Rosemont, the court implied, had purchased the copyright
for the sole purpose of suppressing any publication about Hughes.5 6 In
contrast, Random House had merely sought, as does any biographer, to
serve the public interest by describing the life and work of an exceptional public figure.57 The court admitted that the defendant's work
was something less than scholarly, 58 but nevertheless found that, in light
of the nature of the competing equities, the defendant's appropriation of
the copyrighted material was a permissible fair use. 9
The rejection of a rigid, bright-line test for fair use continued in the
Second Circuit in T7hne Inc. v. Bernard Gets Assoczate. ° In that case, Time
Inc. owned the copyright to the fortuitous "Zapruder" film of the Kennedy assassination. 6 ' Thompson, one of the defendants, was hired by
Time as a consultant in its investigation of the assassination.6 2 With the
knowledge of his immediate supervisor, Thompson photographed key
frames of the film one night after work. 63 After negotiations with Time
to secure use of the frames for Thompson's own book on the assassination had broken down, the defendant Geis published Thompson's book
complete with charcoal sketches made from the appropriated film. 6'
Time sued Geis for infringement. In finding fair use, the court stressed
its view that Thompson had produced a "serious, thoughtful and im54 Id. at 307. But cf Iowa State Univ. Research Found. v. American Broadcasting
Cos., 621 F.2d 57, 61 (2d Cir. 1980) (profit motive not dispositive, but nevertheless important equitable factor).
55 Rosemont, 366 F.2d at 309; see infla notes 66 & 67 and accompanying text.
56 Rosemont, 366 F.2d at 305.
57 Id. at 309. But cf. Meeropol v. Nizer, 560 F. Supp. 1061, 1069-70 (2d Cir. 1977)
(historical interest alone insufficient to establish fair use defense). The extent to which
the public interest in information modifies the scope of copyright protection is unclear.
See Note, One Step Beyond Fair Use: A Direct Pub/c Interest Qualification Premlsed on the Frst
Amendment, 57 N.C.L. REV. 150, 152 (1978); see infra note 67 and accompanying text.
The impact of the public's "right to know" on the law of privacy and defamation is
more clearly defined. See Koussevitzky v. Allen, Towne & Heath, 188 Misc. 479, 68
N.Y.S.2d 779 (state privacy statute construed to exempt biographical works unless fictionalized or novelized in nature), affd, 272 A.D. 759, 69 N.Y.S. 2d 432 (1947); New
York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-82 (1964) (first and fourteenth amendments
require showing of actual malice in libel action brought by public official).
58 Rosemont, 366 F.2d at 307.
59 Id. at 309. But see L. SELTZER, supra note 27, at 42 ("First Amendment and unclean hands factors . . . led court to avoid facing the fair use issue squarely.").
60 293 F. Supp. 130 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).

Id. at 131.
62 Id.at 135.
61

63 Id. at 136.
6 Id. at 138.
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pressive analysis," one deserving of public attention, on a subject of in65
tense national concern.
Time demonstrates the importance of the public interest component, first introduced in Rosemont, in determining fair use cases.6 6 In the
right case, a strong public interest in the availability of copyrighted
materials might outweigh other equitable factors. In Rosemont, the inequitable motives of the copyright holder had helped the court to find fair
use in the name of the public interest. In Time, however, the court
found fair use based on the substantial interest of the public in the subject matter of the copyrighted work despite the infringer's "unclean
hands."
Whether fair use contains an unarticulated first amendment component disguised as the "public interest," or whether the first amendment works in some cases to permit infringement irrespective of harm to
a copyrighted work's marketability, is unclear. 67 The judges in both
Time and Rosemont avoided the harder issue by stressing as support for
their holdings the failure of the plaintiffs in either case to prove damages.6 8 What is clear is that fair use is a nebulous and uncertain doctrine, subject to shifting perceptions of what is fair and equitable.6 9
Both Time and Rosemont seemingly expanded the class of beneficiaries of the fair use doctrine-the scholar and the critic were joined by
the popular biographer and the writer of the expos6. The class was not
expanded, however, at the expense of the doctrine's underlying rationale. The Hughes biographer and Thompson both were productive, not
intrinsic, users.7" Thompson did not attempt to sell the Zapruder film
as the Zapruder film; similarly, Random House did not appropriate the
Look articles per se for sale to another magazine. Each used the earlier
work as a building block, albeit an important one, in a significant and
65

d. at 131-32.

66 But cf.Iowa State Univ. Research Found. v. American Broadcasting Cos., 621 F.2d

57, 60-61 (2d Cir. 1980) (public interest will not justify corporate theft).
67 Cf L. SELTZER, supra note 27, at 41-43 (fair use and first amendment need not be
adversaries); Goldstein, Copyright and the First Amendment, 70 COLUM. L. REV. 983, 983
(1970) ("Copyright is the uniquely legitimate offspring of censorship."); Note, supra note
57, at 163 (public right to know is ultimate concern). See generally Nimmer, Does Copyright Abridge the FirstAmendment Guaranteesof Free Speech andPress?, 17 UCLA L. REV. 1180
(1970) (first amendment and copyright inherently contradictory).
68 Time, 293 F. Supp. at 146; Rosemont, 366 F.2d at 310-11.
69 Dellar v. Samuel Goldwyn, Inc., 104 F.2d 661, 662 (2d Cir. 1939) (per curiam)
(fair use "doctrine" most troublesome in the whole law of copyright); Time Inc. v. Bernard Geis Assocs., 293 F. Supp. 130, 144 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (doctrine "entirely equitable
and is so flexible as virtually to defy definition"); 3 M.NIMMER, supra note 31, § 13.05, at
13-54.1 ("most obscure doctrine").
70 See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
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independent creative endeavor.7 '
The importance of productive use in a determination of fair use
should not be underestimated. It is lore in the law of copyright that the
scholar, the archetypal productive user, could copy an entire manuscript
by hand without infringing the copyright. 72 Whether that rule was ever
true or not, new technologies have made the question largely academic.
The concept of fair use, first developed in the days when wholesale
piracy was physically difficult, has been severely tested by the advent of
modern electronic memory and reproduction devices.7 3
To the office worker or the archivist, photocopying machines and
tape recorders are merely items of convenience; to the manager, the instantaneity of duplication and the fidelity of the copy render those devices tools of efficiency. To copyright holders, however, the same
characteristics of convenience and fidelity, which make copying equipment so useful to society, also pose a threat to the copyright scheme by
removing from them exclusive control over distribution of their work.
The extent to which duplication devices might be put to productive
use without incurring copyright liability was the issue confronted in
Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States.75 The plaintiff, Williams & Wilkins Co., published highly specialized and technical medical journals.76
Rosemont, 366 F.2d at 309; 7}Tne, 293 F. Supp. at 131-32.
72 Sony, 104 S. Ct. at 802 n. 16 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (no case on subject of
whether hand copying constitutes infringement); Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United
States, 487 F.2d 1345, 1350 (Ct. Cl. 1973), af'd by an equally dviedCourt, 420 U.S. 376
71 See

(1974) (per curiam); 3 M. NIMMER, supra note 31, § 13.05 [E][4][a], at 13-80 to 81.
73 See Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 487 F.2d 1345 (Ct. Cl. 1973), aJ'dby
an equally divided Court, 420 U.S. 376 (1974) (per curiam). The Wihllmis & Wilkitis court

distinguished single copying from systematic, mass duplicating. Id. at 1350. The court
specifically observed that
[I]t has long been a matter of common practice for individual scholars to
make manual transcriptions of published material, though copyrighted, for
their own private use, and this practice has not been challenged. Such transcription imposed its own quantitative limitations; and in the nature of the
event, it would not be feasible for copyright owners to control private copying and use. But reproduction for private use takes on different dimensions
when made by modern photocopying devices capable of reproducing

quickly any volume of material in any number of copies, and when copies
are so made to be supplied to other persons.
Id at 1382 (quoting B. VARMER, PHOTODUPLICATION OF COPYRIGHTED MATERIAL BY
LIBRARIES, STUDY No. 15, COPYRIGHT LAW REVISIONS, STUDIES PREPARED FOR THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS AND COPYRIGHTS, SENATE JUDICIARY

(1959)).
COMMITTEE 62-63
74 Baumgarten, Copyright at the Crossroads,BILLBOARD, Nov. 12, 1983, at 10. As early

as 1945, Professor Chafee recognized the impact of technology on the copyright scheme.
See Chafee, Rej6ectitns on the Law of Copyright, 45 COLUM. L. REV. 503 (1945).
75 487 F.2d 1345 (Ct. Cl. 1973), afd by an equally divided Court, 420 U.S. 376 (1974)
(per curiam).
76 Id. at 1347.
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The defendants, the National Institute of Health and the National Library of Medicine, engaged in large-scale, systematic photocopying of
articles from the plaintiff's journals.7 7 Copies were made for in-house
use, as part of an inter-library loan program, or for distribution to independent researchers.78 Although the aggregate number of copies produced per year was enormous, efforts were made to prevent abusive or
excessive use of the program. For example, outside researchers were limited to one article of fifty pages or fewer per journal issue and, except for
distribution to other government libraries, copies were not made of articles still available from the publisher.7 9 Despite the libraries' self-imposed limitations, the plaintiff brought suit for copyright infringement,
alleging a violation of its exclusive right to reproduce the articles.8 ° The
defendants advanced the defense of fair use.8
The Court of Claims found that, during the years in which the
copying had increased, Williams & Wilkins had remained profitable;82
that many of the requests were for older, largely unavailable articles;
and that a holding against fair use would have greatly retarded the progress of medical research.8 3 Weighing those equities, the court found
fair use, intimating that a contrary result would not have benefited the
copyright holder, but would have proven to be deleterious to the public. 4 The court reasoned that halting the program would not have increased, in any significant way, subscriptions to the plaintiff's
magazines; rather, researchers faced with the expense or difficulty of obtaining copies directly from the publisher would have simply foregone
use of the materials.8 5 The issue was not, the court determined, one of
dollars and cents but, instead, the breadth and quality of scientific
research.8 6
Much of the doctrine of fair use developed to compensate for the
shortcomings of the 1909 Act, an Act rendered woefully inadequate by
both the explosion of information and the emerging electronic technolo77

See id at 1347-49.

78

Id.

Id at 1348-49.
80 Id. at 1346-47.
81 Id at 1353.
79

82 Id. at 1357-58; cf. Encyclopaedia Britannica Educ. Corp. v. Crooks, 447 F. Supp.
243, 245, 251 (W.D.N.Y. 1978) (dramatic loss of revenue coupled with allegations of
economic harm sufficient to grant injunction barring mass videotaping), permanent £njunclion issued, 542 F. Supp. 1156 (W.D.N.Y. 1982), modification dented, 558 F. Supp. 1247
(W.D.N.Y. 1983).
83 Williams & Wilkins, 487 F.2d at 1356.
84 Id. at 1358.
85 Id. at 1356-57. But see Gordon, supra note 35, at 1650-52.
86 Williams & Wilkins, 487 F.2d at 1356-57.
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gies of the post-industrial age.87 The unpopularity of the Williams &
Wilkins decision and the equal division of the Supreme Court on its appeal brought into sharp focus the difficulties inherent in addressing new
problems with an old law.88 The Court of Claims's semantic dance
around the statutory language demonstrated that new technologies were
changing long-accepted meanings and that even a simple photocopier
could change the scope of copyright protection.8 9
In 1976, in response to those concerns and others, and after years of
study and numerous proposals, Congress passed the long-overdue revision of the Copyright Act (1976 Act).9 The 1976 Act made two fundamental changes in the law of copyright. First, Congress carved out of
the author's bundle of exclusive rights certain exempted uses which were
not to constitute an infringement. 9 For example, in section 108, Congress provided detailed guidelines for library photocopying of periodicals. The section prohibits systematic copying procedures designed to
supplant subscriptions, but immunizes certain institutional and productive uses from infringement actions.92 Second, Congress adopted in section 107 the modern four-part equivalent to Justice Story's articulation
of the theory of fair use. 93 That section instructs courts of law, whenever
the fair use defense is raised, to weigh (1) the purpose and character of
the use; (2) the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the substantiality of
the portion used in relation to the whole; and (4) the effect on the
94
work's value or potential marketability.
While Congress felt competent to create exemptions in such areas
as library photocopying, secondary transmissions, and public performance, it recognized that other areas were not ripe for statutory treat87 House Report, supra note 37, at 5659-60; Note, Fair Use Looks Different on Videotape,
66 VA. L. REV. 1005 (1980).
88 See, e.g., Gordon, supra note 35, at 1601 & n.9 (citing Nimmer, Photocopying and
Record Piracy: Of Dred Scott and Alice in Wonderland, 22 UCLA L. REV. 1052 (1975)).
89 See WI/ims & Wilkins, 487 F.2d at 1350.

90 Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified at 17 U.S.C.
§§ 101-118 (1982)).
91 See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. §§ 108, 110, 111 (1982). Professor Seltzer has criticized Congress for failing to draw a clear line between exemptions that are not infringements and
infringements that are permitted by the doctrine of fair use. L. SELTZER, supra note 27,
at 17.
92 17 U.S.C. § 108 (1982).
93 For a discussion of Justice Story's test for fair use, see supra notes 43-45 and accompanying text.
94 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1982). This section states that
[n]otwithstanding the provisions of Section 106, the fair use of a copyrighted
work, including such use by reproduction in copies or phonorecords or by
any other means specified by that section, for purposes such as criticism,
comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom
use), scholarship or research, is not an infringement of copyright. In deter-
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ment. 95 Section 107 served a dual function: as a catch-all provision, it
was an important and integral part of a badly needed revision of the
copyright laws; as a delegation of congresssional power, it provided a
time-proven mechanism for resolving future conflicts between access to
copyrighted materials and compensation for their use.9 6 The express
purpose of section 107 was thus neither to freeze in time nor to impede
the growth of the fair use doctrine in any way, but rather to recognize
and endorse the judicial role in defining the scope of copyright
97
protection.
One conflict not specifically addressed by the exemptions of the
1976 Act was the systematic videotaping of copyrighted educational
films from television for later classroom use.9 8 In Encyclopaedia Britannica
Education Corp. v. Crooks,99 producers and suppliers of educational films
sued an arm of the New York State Public School System (BOCES),
alleging that the BOCES program of recording the plaintiffs' films offthe-air infringed their copyrights."°
For years, one of the plaintiffs, Learning Corporation of America
(LCA), had supplied BOCES with educational films under a licensing
mining whether the use made of a work in any particular case is a fair use
the factors to be considered shall include(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is
of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the
copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the
copyrighted work.
Id.
95 See House Report, supra note 37, at 5680 ("no disposition to freeze [fair use] doctrine in the statute, especially during a period of rapid technological change"). The
effect of new technologies, not yet developed or even dreamed of, on the statutory balance could not be predicted. Thus, § 107 leaves courts "free to adapt the doctrine to
particular situations on a case-by-case basis." d.
96 See, e.g., Iowa State Univ. Research Found. v. American Broadcasting Cos., 621
F.2d 57, 60 (2d Cir. 1980); Encyclopaedia Britannica Educ. Corp. v. Crooks, 447 F.
Supp. 243, 248 & n.2 (W.D.N.Y. 1978), permanent injunction issued, 542 F. Supp. 1156
(W.D.N.Y. 1982), modifiatzwn denied, 558 F. Supp. 1247 (W.D.N.Y. 1983); see also S. REP.
No. 473, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 61-62 (1975); supra note 95.
97 See supra note 95.
98 Encyclopaedia Britannica Educ. Corp. v. Crooks, 447 F. Supp. 243, 248 & n.2
(W.D.N.Y. 1978) ("legislative history clearly demonstrates Congress's intent to leave the
problem to the courts pending further negotiations between the film industry and educators aimed at developing guidelines to protect the interests of both groups") (citing
House Report, supra note 37, at 5685), permanent injunction issued, 542 F. Supp. 1156
(W.D.N.Y. 1982), modifcation denied 558 F. Supp. 1247 (W.D.N.Y. 1983).
99 447 F. Supp. 243 (W.D.N.Y. 1978), permanent injunction issued, 542 F. Supp. 1156
(W.D.N.Y. 1982), modification denied, 558 F. Supp. 1247 (W.D.N.Y. 1983).
100 Id. at 245.
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agreement. °' During that time, BOCES accumulated videotape equipment worth one-half million dollars.' 0 2 When an educational film was
broadcast on television, primarily public television, BOCES would
make a master copy and place it in a library.'
Duplicate copies were
made and sent upon request to schools participating in the BOCES program.'0 4 While not all the copies were preserved, the defendant's master
catalogue was extensive enough to generate requests for 10,000 videotapes in 1976 alone.'0 5 When film rental revenues from BOCES
dropped dramatically, the plaintiffs brought suit.106
On a motion for injunctive relief, the United States District Court
for the Western District of New York ordered BOCES to discontinue
videotaping the plaintiffs' films from public television.' 7 An injunction
was appropriate, the court determined, where a copyright holder made
out a prima facie case of infringement and the defendant's claim of fair
use failed to rebut the presumption of harm flowing from infringement.'
The court found that the holding in Wi/iams & Wilkins, upon
which BOCES relied, was not to the contrary.' 0 9 It noted that while the
use in each case was productive, the finding of fair use in Williams &
Wilkins had followed a trial on the merits. "' Since the motion before it
was made at a preliminary stage in the proceedings, the court held that
LCA was entitled to the presumption that the activities of BOCES had
diminished the value of its copyright."'
When a court is confronted with a fair use defense, the issue of
harm to a work's potential marketability-the fourth fair use factor in
section 107 of the 1976 Act-is often dealt with first, particularly when
the question immediately before the court is whether the extraordinary
101 Id LCA's 1975 revenues from BOCES totaled over $12,000. By 1977, BOCES's
payments to LCA were less than $2,000. Id
I02 Id.at 246.
103 Id
104 Id.
105 Id.
106 Id. at

247-48; see also supra note 101 (discussing drop in LCA's revenues from

BOCES).

107 Encyclopaeda Briannzca, 447

108
09
110
111

F. Supp. at 253.

See id.
at 251-52.
Id.at 251.
Id

Id The court not only distinguished Williams & Wzikrnson procedural grounds,
but on substantive grounds as well. Applying the third fair use factor-the amount
copied in relation to the work as a whole-the court distinguished the BOCES procedure of copying an entire film from the practice upheld in Wilhams & Wlkins copying
a limited portion of a copyrighted work. The harm to the copyrighted work's market
value was greater in the former case, the court determined, because "the reproduction is
interchangeable with the original." Id; cf Sony, 104 S. Ct. at 817 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (Betamax owner copies Universal's copyrighted works in their entirety).
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remedy of an injunction should issue. 1 2 Where the previously exploited
market for a copyrighted work includes the use appropriated by the infringer, the burden of proving damages is relatively light.1 13 For example, in Encyclopaedia Britannica, the facts clearly indicated that as the
videotaping by BOCES increased, its need for the films supplied by
LCA decreased. 14 In such a case the underlying balance of the Copyright Act is sharply implicated. In the corporate milieu, decreasing revenues are a powerful disincentive to create; LCA, and others like it,
would simply shift their creative resources to more lucrative markets.
The result is a perversion of the statutory goal of copyright laws:
BOCES keeps its videotapes while society loses a producer of educational films.
A more difficult question arises in the case where, but for the infringing act, a different market would have been available to the copyright holder. That issue was presented in Iowa State Universio Research
Foundation v. American Broadcasting Cos.1 15 The dispute arose during the
1970-1971 school year when James Doran, a student at Iowa State University, helped produce a twenty-eight minute biographical film about a
fellow student, Dan Gable, entitled "Champion".1 16 Prior to Gable's
participation in the 1972 Summer Olympics, Doran tried unsuccessfully
to sell the short to commercial television, including ABC.'17
Despite that initial rebuke, "Champion" became popular among
civic groups and athletic organizations, which rented the film for presentation to their members.1 1
Eventually, ABC obtained a copy of the
film and broadcast significant portions of it both during and after the
Olympics.1 19 When the film's producers sought compensation, ABC denied that it had ever broadcast "Champion." '20 The plaintiff, one of
the film's producers, filed suit for copyright infringement. ABC argued
as part of its fair use defense that the infringing telecasts had enhanced
the film's marketability, 21 noting that rental revenues for the film had
1
increased dramatically after the television broadcasts. 12
112 See, e.g., Universal City Studios v. Sony Corp. II, 480 F. Supp. 429, 463-65 (C.D.
Cal. 1979), rev'don other grounds, 659 F.2d 963 (9th Cir. 1981), rev'd, 104 S. Ct. 774, reh'g
denied, 104 S. Ct. 1619 (1984).
113 Encyclopaedia Britannica,447 F. Supp. at 252.
114 See supra note 101 & accompanying text.
115 621 F.2d 57 (2d Cir. 1980).
116 d. at 58.
117 Id. at 59.
118 Id.

119 Id.
120 Id.
121 Id. at 62.
122 Id.
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Chief Judge Kaufman, writing for the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, rejected the argument. He reasoned that while Iowa State
and Doran certainly had no right to impose the film on network television, they did have the right to refuse to sell it when their price had not
been met. 123 The court determined that ABC's monopolistic control of
the greater alternative market of television did not confer upon it the
by merely increasing the
right to usurp a work's potential marketability
124
work's value in its established market.
As the prior law indicates, the defense of fair use is raised primarily
in cases of direct infringement. In contrast, Sony raised the defense of
fair useJus lertu. Individual Betamax owners, not the corporate defendants, committed the alleged infringing act of copying Universal's programs off-the-air. 1 25 Universal's burden thus was two-fold: first, it had
to show that home videotaping was an actionable infringment; and second, it had to prove that Sony, as the contributing factor, was legally
responsible.
Unlike the Patent Act, 1 26 the Copyright Act does not speak of contributory infringement per se. 1 27 The standards for third-party liability
in copyright infringement actions evolved from the same principles that
governed third-party liability for torts at common law. 128 For example,
under the doctrine of respondeat superior, vicarious liability would be
imposed upon an employer for acts of direct infringement committed by
an employee.129 In the absence of a strict employment relationship, liability for the infringing acts of another would be imposed when the defendant had the right to control, and derived a financial benefit from,
the infringer's activities. 130
An even more attenuated standard for contributory infringement,
one substantially the same as that found in trademark law, 13 1 was en123 Id. Copyright has been properly characterized as a form of monopoly. One characteristic of a monopoly is the power to withdraw goods or services from the market
completely. Chafee, supra note 71, at 507. However, within the confines of copyright
law, the scope of this power may be limited by the first amendment and the doctrine of
fair use. See supra notes 57 & 67 and accompanying text.
124 Iowa Stae, 621 F.2d at 62; cf. Sony, 104 S. Ct. at 811 (Blackmun, J., dissenting)
(Universal entitled to compensation for use of its copyrighted materials in new market
created by the Betamax).
125 See Sony, 104 S. Ct. at 777.
126 See Act of July 19, 1952, Pub. L. No. 593, ch. 950, § 271, 66 Stat. 792, 811 (codi-

fied as amended at 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-376 (1982)); supra note 13.
127 Sony, 104 S. Ct. at 785.
128 Screen Gems-Columbia Music, Inc. v. Mark-Fi Records, Inc., 256 F. Supp. 399,
403 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
129 See, e.g., M. Witmark & Sons v. Calloway, 22 F.2d 412, 414 (E.D. Tenn. 1927).
130 See, e.g., Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. H. L. Green Co., 316 F.2d 304 (2d Cir. 1963).
131 In trademark law, a manufacturer is liable for contributory infringement if he
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dorsed by the Second Circuit in Gershwin Pubhshing Corp. v. Columbia Artists Management, Inc.' 3 2 Columbia Artists (CAMI), a management firm,
organized community groups to sponsor local concerts in order to generate work for musicians.13 3 The musicians supplied CAMI with a list of
34
songs they intended to play and CAMI published the program.
When a copyright holder learned that the musicians had failed to obtain
a public performance license, it sued CAMI.' 3 5 In holding the latter
liable, the court stated that a contributory infringer is "one who, with
knowledge of the infringing activity, induces, causes or materially contributes to the infringing conduct of another."'1 36 The court found that
as the prime instigator and organizer of the offending concerts, CAMI
had sufficiently "caused" the infringement to justify the imposition of
37
contributory liability.
What level of causation constitutes legal cause or how much contribution is "material" are questions as vexatious in the law of copyright
infringement as in any other body of tort law. 138 In copyright law the
issue is compounded by the extensive bundle of exclusive rights afforded
the copyright proprietor. 139 As a copyrighted work moves along the
stream of commerce, there are numerous ways in which an infringing
act can occur. This principle was demonstrated by Kalem Co. v. Harper
Brothers.140
In that case, the defendant Kalem produced a film version of the
novel Ben Hur without the author's permission, itself an act of direct
intentionally induces an infringement or continues to supply to one whom he knows, or
has reason to know, is infringing. The manufacturer is responsible as a contributor even
if he had no direct control over those who actually mislabeled the goods. See Inwood

Laboratories v. Ives Laboratories, 456 U.S. 844, 853-54 (1982).
132 443 F.2d 1159 (2d Cir. 1971); see also Screen Gems-Columbia Music, Inc. v. MarkFi Records, Inc., 256 F. Supp. 399 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) (adopting a similar standard).
133 Gershwin Pubhshing, 443 F.2d at 1159. The work of CAMI, however, was not altruistic. All artists were charged a fee for CAMI's role in organizing the concert. Additionally, those artists under contract for management services were charged the customary
percentage of gross receipts. Id at 1161.
134 Id.
135 Id.
136 Id. at 1162 (footnote omitted). In addition, the court held that the defendant was
liable under the higher standard of vicarious liability. The court determined that the
defendant CAMI had derived a financial benefit from, and had the power to control,
the infringing activity. Id. at 1163.
137 Id.
138 See generally W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF TORTS § 41 (4th ed. 1971)
(discussing proximate cause); Comment, Civil ConspiracvandAiding-Abetting: Discussing the
Structure ofthe Theories andRelated PrinciplesofLegal Causation, 14 SETON HALL L. REV. 627

(1984).
139 See supra note 12.
140 222 U.S. 55 (1911). More accurately, Kalem is a case of both direct and contributory infringement. See infia note 201.
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infringement.' 4 1 Kalem then sold the film to jobbers who arranged for
its exhibition. 142 Kalem argued that because it did not exhibit the film
it could not be held liable. 143 Justice Holmes, writing for the Supreme
Court, did not agree. Kalem, he noted, had made the film "especially"
for the purpose of public performance, which constituted an infringing
act. 14 4 Moreover, he stressed that the defendant had advertised the film
expressly for that purpose.'
Kalem, Justice Holmes concluded, could
not argue that its involvement was so attenuated as to preclude liability
14 6
simply because it did not commit the final infringing act.
In dicta, Justice Holmes sought to contrast the direct infringer,
Kalem, with an innocent merchant by suggesting that the seller of "an
ordinary article of commerce" might not be contributorially liable for a
"subsequent illegal use by the buyer."'' 47 A grain merchant, for example, should not be held liable for the acts of a customer-turned-moonshiner. In a technologically complex society, Justice Holmes's concern
with the free flow of goods and services survives in the staple item of
commerce doctrine. That doctrine, while constituting in the context of
the Sony decision one of the intersections of copyright and patent law,
developed primarily in the law of patents.148
The Supreme Court recently explicated the doctrine in Dawson
Chemical Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co.' 4 9 The plaintiff, Rohm & Haas, obtained a patent on a process to inhibit weed growth through the application of propanil, an unpatentable and non-staple chemical. 5 ° Dawson
Chemical, a long-time supplier of propanil, unsuccessfully sought a license to sell the chemical. 5 ' When Dawson continued to sell propanil
to farmers, Rohm & Haas sued for contributory infringement under the
Patent Code.' 5 2 Dawson maintained that the plaintiffs practice of "tying" the sale of the patented process to an unpatented chemical and
denying a license to other propanil producers constituted patent
misuse. 153
141 Kalem, 222 U.S. at 60.
142

Id. at 62.

143 Id. at 59.
144 Id. at 62-63.

Id.
Id. at 63.
147 Id. at 62.
148 Carbice Corp. v. American Patents Dev. Corp., 238 U.S. 27 (1931); Note, A Clarification of Section 271 of the Patent Act that Restricts the Doctrine of Patent Misuse, 8 RUTGERS
COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 321, 329-30 (1981).
149 448 U.S. 176, reh'g denied, 448 U.S. 917 (1980).
150 Id.at 182.
145

146

151 Id.at 183.
152

Id. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(c) (1982).

153 Dawson Chem., 448 U.S. at 184; see also Mercoid Corp. v. Minneapolis-Honeywell
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Justice Blackmun, writing for the Court, noted that the Patent
Code struck a balance between the opposing doctrines of contributory
infringement and patent misuse. 54 He found that in exchange for a
narrow definition of patent misuse, Congress sought to insulate the sale
of items capable of substantial non-infringing uses from contributory infringement actions. 155 Since propanil was not a staple item and was
useful only as an agent in the plaintiff's patented process, Justice Black56
mun concluded that Rohm & Haas was entitled to control its sale.'
The underlying premise of the staple item of commerce doctrine is
the notion that patent holders should be precluded from controlling the
cost and availability of items capable of diverse and utilitarian functions."' This tension between private monopoly and public availability
is the same as the one that exists between private incentive and public
access in the copyright scheme. 15 ' The Dawson Chemical Court simply
determined that, in the case of non-staple goods, Congress had resolved
the tension in favor of the private monopoly.' 59 Given the paucity of
congressional directives in copyright law, Universal's suit against Sony
posed a more difficult problem.
Resolution of the conflict in Sony meant balancing Universal's private incentive to create-its interest in fair compensation for use of its
copyrighted works-against Sony's contribution to the technology of
public access to copyrighted materials. Weighing in the balance was the
perceived benefit that the Betamax conferred on the general public." 6
Whatever social utililty the Betamax had at the inception of Universal's
suit involved its potential impact on the manner in which the public
received information; at the outset of the litigation, the delivery system
most affected was advertiser-sponsored free broadcast. 6 ' In Sony, the
district court found that the average member of the public used the
Regulator Co., 320 U.S. 680 (1944) (patent misuse where utilization of patented goods
required purchase of unpatented item from exclusive licensee); Mercoid Corp. v. MidContinent Inv. Co., 320 U.S. 661 (1944) (licensing scheme as attempt to extend monopoly to unpatented goods constituted patent misuse); Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502 (1917) (invention delineated by claims in patent
thereby limiting legal monopoly to invention itself). See generally Note, Extendng the Patent Monopoly to UnpatentedNonstaple Goods, 30 DE PAUL L. REV. 875, 877-83 (1981) (tracing development of contributory infringement and patent misuse).
154 See Dawson Chem., 448 U.S. at 179-80, 200-01.
155 Id. at 213.
156 Id. at 214.
157 Sony, 104 S. Ct. at 788.
158 See id. at 782.
159 Dawson Chem., 448 U.S. at 201.
160 See Sony, 104 S. Ct. at 780, 789, 792.
161 Universal City Studios v. Sony Corp. II, 480 F. Supp. 429, 442 (C.D. Cal. 1979),
rev'd, 659 F.2d 963 (9th Cir. 1981), rev'd, 104 S. Ct. 774, reh'g denied, 104 S. Ct. 1619
(1984).

COMMENT

1984]

Betamax to receive and record free broadcast television in the privacy of
the home, primarily for later viewing. 62 The scope of the district
court's fair use holding was expressly limited to that activity.' 63 The
relationship between broadcaster and receiver and the importance of
technology in fostering that relationship has not escaped comment by
the Supreme Court.
In Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists,'64 the plaintiff United Artists
(UA), brought suit against the defendant, Fortnightly, a community antenna television (CATV) operator, for copyright infringement.1 6 5 The
defendant's antenna system, placed high atop local hills, received televi166
sion stations normally blocked by the area's mountainous terrain.
The signals were amplified and distributed to subscribers by cable for a
fee.' 6 7 While UA had licensed the original broadcaster, the secondary
amplification by the CATV operator was unauthorized."6 UA alleged
that the secondary transmission constituted a public performance under
1 69
the 1909 Act and was, therefore, an infringement.
The Supreme Court disagreed. Justice Stewart, writing for the
Court, focused on the role CATV played in the transformation of electronic signals into the flickering images of the television screen.' 7 0 He
reasoned that somewhere in the process of broadcasting there existed an
invisible line separating the broadcaster from the television viewer. 7'
On one side stood the broadcaster, hurling his signals out over the airwaves for all to receive; on the other, the receiver, tuning, watching, and
listening. 172 Clearly, Justice Stewart determined, the broadcaster was a
performer, and the viewer merely a "passive beneficiary."' 173 The sole
issue was the function of CATV in this magical process made simple.' 74
Justice Stewart determined that CATV was a receiving, rather
than a performing, function; the result derived from utilizing CATV
was indistinguishable from that achieved if the viewer had placed the
antenna on a higher elevation and run the cable himself.' 75 CATV, he
concluded, merely enhanced and augmented a viewer's ability to
Id. at 438.
Id. at 442.
164 392 U.S. 390 (1967).
165 Id. at 393.
162
163

166 Id.at
167 Iad at
168 Id. at
169 Id. at
170 Id at
171 Id. at
172 Id. at
173 Id.at
174 Id at
175

391.

392-93.
393.
395.
397.
398-99.
397-98.
398-99.
397.
Id. at 399-400.
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receive. 176
The apparent simplicity of Justice Stewart's reasoning belied a hidden sophistication. The notion that viewers or listeners are beneficiaries
of the free broadcast system, in much the same way as the public-atlarge benefits from the copyright scheme, was not unique to Fortnightly.
The public trust doctrine, subsequently reaffirmed in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC,7 7 emphasized the "paramount" interest of viewers and
listeners in free broadcasting. 7 " Nevertheless, Justice Stewart, as the
Fortnghtly dissent concluded, could just as easily have decided that
CATV re-transmission constituted an infringing performance.17 To
the dissent, the majority focused on CATV's receiving function and all
but ignored its broadcasting function in a less than convincing effort to
foster new technologies. 8 0
Irrespective of any hidden agenda on the part of the Supreme
Court, the electronic media in general and radio and television stations
in particular continued to proliferate unabated in the 1960's and
1970's.181 In Twentieth Centur Music Corp. v. Aiken," a2 the pervasiveness of
broadcasted signals in modern society contributed to a new resolution of
an old conflict between owners and users of copyrighted materials. The
defendant, George Aiken, installed a radio and speakers in his fast-food
restaurant in order to enhance the gastronomic pleasure of his patrons. 3 A music publisher sued Aiken for copyright infringement, alleging that the playing of the radio constituted an unauthorized public
performance.184
As he had done seven years earlier, Justice Stewart rejected that
argument. The Fortnightly Court, he pointed out, had decided that receiving was not equivalent to performing.' 8 5 He observed that Buck v.
Id at 399.
177 395 U.S. 367 (1974).
178 Id. at 390. Note, From the FCCs FairnessDoctrine to Red Lion's Fiduciay Principle,5
176

HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 89, 95 (1970) (Court "restor[ed] to prominence the cardinal

purpose of the First Amendment:
experiences").

the assurance of a multiplicity of ideas and

179 Fortnightly, 392 U.S. at 406-07 (Fortas, J., dissenting). Fortnightly did, after all,
amplify and modify the incoming signal. Id at 392. Moreover, CATV operators were
not patriotic promoters of the first amendment as much as they were quintessential entrepreneurs. See id at 392-93.
180

Id. at 404-05 (Fortas, J., dissenting).

181 Wiley, Post-1970Expansion of Video Outlets, in THE LAWYER AND THE NEW
MARKETPLACE
182 422 U.S.

152.
Id.at 153.
Id. at 160-61.

183 Id.at
184
185

II 4 (ABA Forum Committee on Communications Law 1983).
151 (1974).

VIDEO
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Co.,

18 6

in which the Court had taken the contrary

position, could be distinguished factually, because in the instant case,
unlike Buck, the original broadcast had been licensed by the plaintiffthus the copyright holder had already received compensation for the
public performance."8 7 To find an infringement, and thus to countenance a second license, he reasoned, would be an undue and inequitable
burden on the listener and would exact a tribute beyond what would be
fair compensation to the copyright owner. 88
The concurrence of Justice Blackmun was quick to note that, once
again, Justice Stewart had ignored the receiver's profit motive. Justice
Stewart's opinion, however, was more a product of pragmatism than
precedent. 8 9 He implied that radios and televisions had become as
much a part of Americana as bars and beauty shops.'9° Long fixtures at
home, the public had grown to accept and even expect their presence in
even the most public of places. For Justice Stewart, the multiplicity of
receivers furthered the goal of access to entertainment and information.
As long as copyright proprietors received a fair return on their investments through broadcasting, licensing, and advertising revenues, the
Court struck the proper balance between access and compensation.' 9 '
Attaining fair compensation for copyright owners so that artists
and writers will be inspired to produce art and disseminate information
for the eventual benefit of all is the essential purpose of copyright law.' 9 2
It is with the statutory framework designed to achieve that end that
Justice Stevens, writing for the majority in Sony, began his analysis.'
The statute, he observed, strikes a careful balance: a monopoly is con186

283 U.S. 191 (1930).

187

Twentieth Century Musc, 442 U.S. at 160-61.

188 See id. at 162-63.
189 See id at 164-66 (Blackmun, J., concurring).

190 See id at 162.
191 See id at 162-63.
192 Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954); Berlin v. E.C. Publications, Inc., 329
F.2d 541, 544 (2d Cir. 1964); see Wainwright Sec., Inc. v. Wall St. Transcript Corp., 558
F.2d 91, 94 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. dented, 434 U.S. 1014 (1978); supra note 35 and accompanying text.
193 The analytical sequence chosen by Justice Stevens differs remarkably from that
chosen by the trial and reviewing court. Framing the issue as one confronting the activity of home video recording, the trial court began its analysis with the question of the
legality of that activity, despite the fact that no relief was sought from those Betamax
owners named as defendants. By holding that the Copyright Act exempted home recording and, alternatively, that home recording was fair use, the trial court absolved
Sony from contributory infringement liability. Despite this, and relying on the staple
item of commerce theory, the court proceeded to absolve Sony as a contributory infringer. See supra notes 20-23 and accompanying text.
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit adopted the same framework, if for no other reason
than analytical convenience. By reversing the trial court on the issues of an implied
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ferred, but a limited one-broad enough to ensure creativity, but narrow enough to provide the public with reasonable access. 1 94 Upon
congressional failure to amend the copyright scheme in the face of new
technology, he asserted, it is the duty of the Court to interpret the existing legislation with the foregoing balance in mind.195
exemption and fair use, Sony's liability as a contributory infringer was properly before
the reviewing court. See supra notes 25-28 and accompanying text.
In contrast, the analysis of Justice Stevens begins not with ambiguous legislative
histories or obscure and difficult doctrines, but rather with the straightforward question
of Sony's liability as a manufacturer of copying equipment. See infra notes 198-207 and
accompanying text. This view of the case, however, may lend support to the argument
that the majority confused remedy with liability. See Sony, 104 S. Ct. at 815 (Blackmun,

J., dissenting).
194

Sony, 104 S. Ct. at 782.

195 Id. at 783-84 (quoting Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156

(1974)). Before the Supreme Court decision in Sony, several bills were introduced in
Congress that were designed to resolve legislatively the Betamax controversy. See, e.g.,
H.R. 4794, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982) (no liability for private purpose; establishing
compulsory licensing for importers and manufacturers of video recording devices and
media who commercially benefit); H.R. 4808, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981) (exemption of
recording for private use of non-commercial nature).
Those forces objecting to unrestrained home recording sought a retail tax on the
sale of blank tape or on the machines themselves. See Home Recording ofCopyrighted Works.
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties and the Administration ofjustice of the
House Comm. on theJudtciaq, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Home
Recording Hearings] (testimony of Jack Valenti, President, Motion Picture Association of
America). Those opposed to such taxes sought to amend the Copyright Act to exempt
from copyright protection all non-commercial, private use, home recording. Id. at 158,
160 (statement of Charles D. Ferris, Counsel to Home Recording Rights Coalition).
Professor Tribe, in a memorandum of law prepared under the auspices of the Motion Picture Association of America, has argued that the latter proposal, if passed, would
have amounted to an unconstitutional taking of private property. L. Tribe, Memorandum of Constitutional Law on Copyright Compensation Issues Raised by the Proposed
Congressional Reversal of the Ninth Circuit's Betamax Ruling 2 (1981), reprintedin THE
LAWYER AND THE NEW VIDEO MARKETPLACE II 17 (ABA Forum Committee on Communications Law 1983).
Professor Tribe's argument is a tautology and therefore fallacious. To assume that
the Copyright Act as previously written included the right to intrude within the province of the home by declaring home video recording illegal is to assume the very question at issue.
Professor Tribe acknowledges that Congress could argue that an amendment exemption to home recording amounts to a mere classification of existing law. Id. at 39.
He insists, however, that such an argument, if successful, would intrude upon the power
of the courts to declare, in Justice Marshall's words, "what the law is." Id at 40 (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177-78 (1803)).
This proposition is equally untenable. First, the argument assumes an inflexibility
in constitutional government that is shocking in its implications. Certainly, the framers
did not intend to straddle, ad infinitum, future Congresses with definitions of propertyand for that matter, similar rights and privileges-conceived in worlds that no longer
exist. It is one of the greatest strengths of American constitutional government to grant
to Congress, the branch of government most responsive to the needs of the people, the
power to redefine the rights and privileges of its citizens when previous enactments have
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Justice Stevens stressed that the law of copyright has never found it
necessary to grant a copyright holder absolute control over his or her
work; some uses, even if unauthorized, are deemed fair.' 9 6 Moreover, he
noted that a copyright proprietor can, consistent with the Act, authorize
any of the exclusive uses.' 97
Justice Stevens focused next on the parties. He emphasized that
Universal had sought relief not from the individual Betamax owners
who constituted the alleged direct infringers, but rather from Sony for
supplying the means to infringe.' 9 8 Sony's liability, if any, was predicated upon its position as a manufacturer of copying equipment.' 9 9 By
viewing the case in that light, the Court rejected Universal's reliance on
Kalem. Kalem, according to the Court, did not stand for the broad proposition that liability for contributory infringement flows automatically
from supplying the means to infringe."0° Acknowledging that Kalem was
a case involving vicarious liability,2 ' Justice Stevens nevertheless distinbeen rendered obsolete and oppressive by the change of time. See Immigration and Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 103 S. Ct. 2764, 2798 (1983) (White, J., dissenting).
Moreover, such an argument ignores the fact that the Constitution expressly grants
to Congress, in the first instance, the power to define the nature and extent of copyright
protection. See text accompanying supra note 30. To transfer to the courts a plenary
power of Congress would itself be a violation of the separation of powers. It is the purpose of the "taking" clause to prohibit irrational and arbitrary governmental action, not
to impede the progress of democratic and constitutional government. See generally Gibbons, The Interdependence ofLegitimacy: An Introduction to the Meaning ofSeparatonof Powers, 5
SETON HALL L. REV. 435 (1974).
196 Sony, 104 S. Ct. at 784.
197 Id. at 789-90. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1982).
198 See Sony, 104 S. Ct. at 785. The one named individual defendant was in fact a
client of plaintiffs' law firm. Id. at 779 n.3.
199 Id. at 787.
200 Id. at 786.
201 Id. In Sony, Universal relied on Kalem to support its claim that Sony was liable as a
contributory infringer. Universal claimed that, just as Kalem had produced the dramatization for the purposes of an infringing public performance, Sony had manufactured
the Betamax for the purpose of copying broadcasted copyrighted materials. See Universal City Studios v. Sony Corp. II, 480 F. Supp. 429, 457-59 (C.D. Cal. 1979), rev'd, 659
F.2d 963 (9th Cir. 1981), rev'd, 104 S. Ct. 774, reh'g denied, 104 S. Ct. 1619 (1984).
Kalem is, however, not purely a case of contributory infringement; rather, the defendant Kalem was both a direct and contributory infringer. Kalem, 222 U.S. at 62-63.
Justice Holmes held that the act of making the film constituted a direct violation of
plaintiff's exclusive right to dramatize Ben Hur. Id. at 61. The language relied on by
Universal is properly characterized as dictum aimed at refuting Kalem's rather absurd
argument that even if they were direct infringers, they were not contributors to the final
act of public performance. See id. at 62-63.
The distinction lies in the applicable remedies. The Copyright Act in force at the
time provided damages for the infringing act of public performance and dramatization
based on general civil damage theories. See id. at 59. The remedy for the making of a
copy-for example a photograph-that infringed a copyright, however, included both
confiscation of the plate and statutory damages. Id. Implicitly rejecting Kalem's argument that the film was merely a series of non-infringing photographs or, in the alterna-
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guished Sony on its facts. 2 ° 2 Unlike Sony, he noted, the Kalem Company
had supplied more than the means to infringe-it had supplied the infringing copy. 2 3 Sony's involvement, he maintained, was much more
attenuated: while it did supply the Betamax, Universal supplied the
copy by licensing the broadcast.2 0 4
If Sony was liable at all, the Court contended, it would have been
because it had constructive knowledge that its product would be used to
infringe the copyrights of others.2" 5 The majority observed that only
patent law imposes liability for the sale of hardware based on such a
theory-and then only if the item sold is not capable of substantial noninfringing uses. 20 6 Adopting for his analysis the staple item of commerce
doctrine found in patent law, Justice Stevens posited two substantial
non-infringing uses of the Betamax: authorized time-shifting, and un20 7
authorized time-shifting excused by fair use.
First, he reiterated the district court's finding that most Betamax
owners use their machines to time-shift, thereby establishing the substantiality of the use.20 Next, Justice Stevens noted the testimony at
trial that many copyright proprietors not only authorize but also encourage that activity because it increases their audience size by allowing
those not at home during the original broadcast to view the program at
tive, infringing photographs subject to confiscation, Justice Holmes found Kalem liable
as a direct infringer for the dramatization. Id. at 61. In contrast, Sony was never found
liable as a direct infringer. Sony, 480 F. Supp. at 458. The argument was never advanced, nor could it be, that the act of manufacturing or selling the Betamax constituted
an act of direct copyright infringement.
202 See Sony, 104 S. Ct. at 786-87.
203 Id.
204 Id. In contrast, the dissent deemed the fact of free broadcasting "irrelevant."

Id.

at 808-09 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
205 Id. at 787. It is well established in cases of contributory infringement that the
plaintiff may show that the defendant either knew or should have known of the infringing nature of the goods or activity. See, e.g., Screen Gems-Columbia Music, Inc. v.
Mark-Fi Records, Inc., 256 F. Supp. 399, 403 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
206 Sony, 104 S. Ct. at 788. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(c) (1982). Patent law has recognized
that the unrestrained use of the patent monopoly could unfairly burden the flow of noninfringing goods and services. See Henry v. A.B. Dick Co., 224 U.S. 1, 48 (1912) (use of
patent to prevent sale of item capable of diverse uses blocks the "wheels of commerce").
207 Sony, 104 S. Ct. at 789.
208 See id For a discussion of time-shifting, see supra note 7.
It is ironic that, in Sony, a case arising because of the rapidity of technological
change, the Supreme Court should rely on factual determinations that were, by the time
of the decision, some eight years old. This is, regrettably, a fact of modern appellate
practice. Today the primary use of the Betamax may not be time-shifting, but the playback of pre-recorded tapes. N.Y. Times, Feb. 12, 1984, at 30, col. 3. Thus the primary
threat to the property of Hollywood may not be the Betamax but the first sale doctrine,
a doctrine that has in many cases precluded the studios from receiving their fair share of
the substantial and growing cassette rental business. See SIGHT & SOUND MARKETING,
Oct. 1983, at 58.
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a later time.2" 9 Universal and Disney, the Court noted, represent just a
fraction of the copyright proprietors that supply television programming.2" ' Their monopoly, the Court concluded, does not include the
right to frustrate the authorized copying of works owned by others.2 1 1
While Justice Stevens recognized that some copyright holders object to
the copying of their works for any purpose, the Court held unauthorized
time-shifting to be a second substantial non-infringing use. 2 12 Applying
the four statutory factors, 21 3 it concluded that time-shifting is a fair, and
2 14
therefore not an infringing, use of the respondents' works.
Applying the first fair use factor, the Court found that the purpose
of the use is noncommerical in that the viewer intends to use copies for
private in-home use. 2 15 Moreover, Justice Stevens noted that time-shift209 Sony, 104 S. Ct. at 790-91. The Court relied heavily on the testimony of Mr. Rogers, producer of Mr. Rogers' Neighborhood, a popular children's show broadcast primarily on public television. See id. Mr. Rogers testified that time-shifting allowed
parents to record "The Neighborhood" for viewing at times more appropriate for their
children. Id. at 790 n.27.
The Court also relied on the testimony of various representatives of the major professional sports who did not object to Betamax recording. See id. at 790 n.24. Two
professional sports organizations subsequently reversed this position and filed affidavits
in support of Universal's petition for rehearing. See BILLBOARD, Mar. 3, 1984, at 3.
Rehearing was denied. Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, 104 S. Ct. 1619 (1984).
210 Sony, 104 S. Ct. at 789.
211 Id. at 791.
212 Id. at 789.
213 Although the statute lists the four factors that may be considered, see supra note 94,
it is within the purview of the reviewing court to determine which factors will be considered and the relative weight to assign to each. The resulting discretion has impacted
upon the balancing process-the balances change with the type of infringing activity.
See Timberg, A Modernized Fair Use Code for the Electronic As Well As the Gutenberg Age, 75
Nw. U.L. REV. 193, 202 (1980); Note, supra note 57, at 153 n.29.
In Sony, where no question of the substantiality of the taking was presented, the
Court focused on the first and fourth factors-the purpose and character of the use and
the extent of harm. Cf Walt Disney Prods. v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751 (9th Cir. 1978)
(balance in parody cases by considering third and fourth factors--substantiality of taking and extent of harm).
Generally, wholesale copying precludes a finding of fair use. Marcus v. Rowley,
695 F.2d 1171, 1176 (9th Cir. 1983). It must be remembered, however, that in the
Betamax case, Sony did not copy anything; rather, the plaintiffs sought liability on the
basis of contributory infringement theory. In Sony, the proper inquiry concerns the propriety of copying the plethora of software broadcast over the public air waves under the
rubric of fair use, i.e., that copying done by thousands of unknown Betamax owners.
Thus, the inquiry is more appropriately focused on the second factor-the nature of all
freely broadcasted software-and the fourth factor-the extent of harm to the marketability of that software. See infia text accompanying notes 275-90.
214 Sony, 104 S. Ct. at 796.
215 Id. at 792. But cf Rubin v. Boston Magazine Co., 645 F.2d 80, 84 (1st Cir. 1981)
(commercial gain presumptively unfair); Triangle Publications v. Knight-Ridder Newspapers, 626 F.2d 1171, 1175 (5th Cir. 1980) (same); Comment, Photocopying and Fair Use.
An Examination of the Economic Factorin Fair Use, 26 EMORY L.J. 849, 857 (1977) (if use is
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ing produces a result consistent with the original intent of the broadcaster-to reach as many viewers as possible.2 16 Most importantly,
applying the fourth factor, Justice Stevens found that Universal had
failed to prove that time-shifting had in the past, or would in the future,
2 17
harm the value of its copyrights.
The Court further asserted that both authorized and unauthorized
time-shifting promote the wide dissemination of information, a goal
consistent with the free broadcast system. 2 18 In essence, Justice Stevens
determined that, under the copyright laws as presently enacted, Sony
could not be held liable for the sale of copying equipment capable of
substantial, and socially beneficial, non-infringing uses.2 19
Justice Blackmun, joined by three members of the Court, dissented. 220 He began his analysis by asserting that the district court's
reading of the legislative history was inconsistent with the statute itself.221 If Congress, he declared, had intended to create a broad single
copy exemption, then the statute's numerous single copy provisions
would be mere surplusage. 22 2 He labelled as further error the trial
court's finding of an implied exemption for home recording in the legislative history of the 1971 record piracy amendments. 2 3 Justice Blackmun asserted that the purpose of those amendments was merely to
expand the protection afforded sound recordings-the neglected
stepchild of the 1909 Act. 22 4 Universal, on the other hand, produced
visual works which, he contended, historically had been afforded greater
commercial it does not promote learning and thus does not advance cause of copyright).
The Court found that time-shifting merely allowed the viewer to do what the broadcaster had intended all along-to view the broadcast in its "entirety free of charge."
Sony, 104 S. Ct. at 792.
216 See Sony, 104 S. Ct. at 792.
217 Id. at 793.
218 Id. at 795 (citing Community Television v. Gottfried, 103 S. Ct. 885, 891-92
(1983)); see also supra text accompanying notes 162-92.
219 Sony, 104 S. Ct. at 796.
220 Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justices Marshall, Powell, and Rehnquist joined
Justice Blackmun in dissent. The alignment of Justice Brennan with Chief Justice Burger for the majority and Justice Rehnquist with Justice Marshall for the dissent sparked
commentary in the popular press. Washington Post, Jan. 22, 1984, at A3, col. 1. The
deviation from the expected liberal/conservative dichotomy was easily explained by
popular wisdom: the Betamax case was not a "social issue." Id.
221 Sony, 104 S. Ct. at 800-01 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
222 Id.
223 Id. at 804-05 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The majority carefully eschewed the district court's controversial reading of the legislative history. Id. at 783 n. 11.
224 Id. at 805 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Loopholes in the 1909 Act rendered sound
recordings particularly vulnerable to piracy. While the Act had always protected the
underlying musical composition, no protection was afforded the performing artist's recorded version. Nimmer, supra note 13, at 1508.
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81

protection under the copyright scheme.2 25 The dissent asserted that the
making of a single copy of an audio-visual work, even at home for private use, constitutes an infringement unless it is excused as fair use.226
Justice Blackmun analyzed fair use as a balance between dual risks:
while the grant of the monopoly decreases the risk that artists will not be
creative, it increases the risk that second authors will forego the use of
earlier copyrighted works because of CoSt. 227 By eliminating the cost, he
maintained, fair use encourages the creative use of earlier works.2 28
Whatever disincentive to create results from a finding of fair use, he
opined, is compensated by the benefit society derives from the second
author's productive use of the first author's work.22 9
Justice Blackmun characterized the Betamax owner as an ordinary,
as opposed to productive, user. 230 An ordinary user, motivated by personal gain, appropriates a work for its intrinsic value alone. 23 , Thus,
because it increases the disincentive risk without a counter-balancing
benefit to society, ordinary use is presumptively unfair.2 32
The dissent acknowledged that some non-productive uses can still
be fair use because of the de minimus harm that they inflict upon the
potential market for the copyrighted work. 233 Justice Blackmun contended, however, that the district court had placed upon Universal the
impossible burden of proving actual or probable harm resulting from a
new device, the copyright implications of which were largely unknown.2 34 When a use is ordinary, he concluded, the copyright owner
should only be required to demonstrate potential harm. 235 He maintained that Universal had shown numerous ways in which the Betamax
225 Sony, 104 S. Ct. at 805 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). But see Atari, Inc. v. North Am.
Philips Consumer Elec. Corp., 672 F.2d 607, 619 (7th Cir. 1982) (video game not entitled to broader protection simply because it is audio-visual work). Whatever distinction
may have existed previously between audio recordings and audio-visual works may soon
be rendered meaningless by the continued onslaught of new technology. Stereo broadcast television, video machines newly marketed with audio capability beyond that of
conventional reel to reel recorders, and the popularity of hi-fidelity video programming
such as MTV tend to blur, and will eventually erase, the distinction between audio and
video copyrighted works.
226 Sony, 104 S. Ct. at 806 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
227 Id at 808 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). See L. SELTZER, supra note 27, at 28-37.
228 Sony, 104 S. Ct. at 807 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
229 Id. See supra note 27.
230 Sony, 104 S. Ct. at 808-09 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).

231 See id.
232 Id.
233 Id. at 809 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun's example of an old newspaper clipping is an implicit recognition of the concept of disposable software. See id;
infra notes 270-78 and accompanying text.
234 Sony, 104 S. Ct. at 810 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
235 Id. at 811 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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could harm the marketability of its copyrights. 236
One example of the harm, he found, could be adduced from the
facts before him. The playback capabilities of the Betamax have created a vast market for the respondents' movies and television shows-a
market which has been usurped by the machine's recording capabilities. 237 The sale of blank tape, he maintained, demonstrates the willingness of consumers to pay for the respondents' works. 238 Those sales, the
dissent determined, rightfully belong to Universal by virtue of its copyrights; the fact that Sony has created the market by manufacturing the
Betamax is irrelevant.23 9
Justice Blackmun stressed that Sony has derived a commercial gain
from the infringing activity of Betamax owners, a fact not irrelevant to
the issue of contributory infringement. 240 He noted that the law of
copyright has never required direct involvement in the infringing activity. 241 Rather, he maintained, liability attaches where the defendant
"induces, causes or materially contributes" to an infringement. 24 2 Justice Blackmun concluded that Sony's involvement met this test-not
only would the infringement not have occurred without the Betamax,
but Sony's advertising revealed off-the-air recording to the machine's
intended use.243
Justice Blackmun also found fault with the majority's analogy to
patent law. 244 While he agreed that the'sale of a true staple item should
not be enjoined, he would hold the seller liable if virtually all of a product's use is infringing. 245 In light of the district court's failure to determine the percentage of infringing versus non-infringing use, he urged
remand.2 4 6 Moreover, he chastised the Court for expanding the doc236 Id. at 810 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The studios had contended that the
Betamax would impact adversely on movie theater revenues, sales and rental of prerecorded videotapes and discs, syndication, and advertising revenues. Id
237 Id. at 811 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Universal, understandably, did not object to
a "playback-only" Betamax. Universal City Studios v. Sony Corp. II, 480 F. Supp. 429,
463 (C.D. Cal. 1979), rev'd, 659 F.2d 963 (9th Cir. 1981), rev'd, 104 S. Ct. 774, reh'g denied,

104 S. Ct. 1619 (1984).
Sony, 104 S. Ct. at 811 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
Id. (citing Iowa State Univ. Research Found. v. American Broadcasting Cos., 621
F.2d 57 (2d Cir. 1980)). See supra notes 116-25 and accompanying text.
240 See Sony, 104 S. Ct. at 812 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
238

239

241 Id.

242 Id. (quoting Gershwin Publishing Corp. v. Columbia Artists Management, 443
F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d Cir. 1979) (footnote omitted)).
243 Id. at 813 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); cf. Xalem, 222 U.S. at 63 (defendant's films
"especially" made for public performance, an infringing act).
244 Sony, 104 S. Ct. at 814 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
245 Id
246 Id at 814-15 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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trine of fair use beyond its traditional boundaries.24 7 The majority, he
stated, misapplied the statutory test by ignoring the second and third
factors.24 8 Those factors instruct a court to weigh "the nature of the
copyrighted work" and the "substantiality of the portion used."2 4 9 He
stressed that the Betamax owner copies entertainment, the most protected of artistic works, in its entirety for personal consumption-a far
cry from the scholar's borrowed snippet from an author's work, the
practice fair use was developed to protect.25 ° Justice Blackmun further
disputed Justice Stevens's characterization of home videotaping as noncommercial. 25 ' In his view, Betamax recording of copyrighted materials
is equivalent to theft, even if performed at home.2 52
Finally, Justice Blackmun opined that the majority had confused
remedy with liability. 25 3 He intimated that the majority adopted the
patent law infringement standard and misapplied the fair use factors
because it feared halting the "wheels of commerce, ' 254 an unjustified
concern when viewed against the backdrop of the remedies available to
the trial court. 255 The majority's fear of an injunction, he concluded,
should not have prevented the district court from fashioning a less drastic and more equitable remedy.2 56
Justice Blackmun's dissent would have one believe that the Sony
decision represents a radical departure from established precedent in the
law of fair use and contributory infringement. 2 -7 It is neither. As a case
involving the dissemination of information through the unique medium
Id. at 815 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
Id. at 816 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
249 See supra note 94.
250 Sony, 104 S. Ct. at 816 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Works of entertainment enjoy a
higher level of copyright protection than pure news. Compare Benny v. Loew's Inc., 239
F.2d 532, 535-36 (9th Cir. 1956) (burlesque substantially similar to copyrighted play not
protected by fair use), afd by an equally divided Court, 356 U.S. 43, reh'g denied, 356 U.S. 934
(1958) with Time Inc. v. Bernard Geis Assocs., 293 F. Supp. 130, 144-46 (S.D.N.Y. 1968)
(charcoal sketches of frames of copyrighted film of historical event held protected by fair
use).
251 Sony, 104 S. Ct. at 816-17 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
252 See id
253 Id. at 815-16 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
254 Id. See supra note 206 and accompanying text.
255 See Sony, 104 S. Ct., at 815-16 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); see also 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)
(1982) (remedies for infringement); 3 M. NIMMER, supra note 31, § 13.05[E][4][e] at 1391 to 92 (same). The remedies suggested by the dissent and court of appeals included:
modification of the machine to eliminate the tuner, the scrambling of broadcast signals,
a compulsory royalty for the use of a particular copyrighted work, a general royalty to
be paid to all copyright proprietors from a fund generated by a tax on sales of VCRs
and blank tape, and statutory damages where individual acts of infringement could be
shown. See Sony, 104 S. Ct. at 815-16 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
256 See Sony, 104 S. Ct. at 818 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
257 Id. at 815 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
247

248
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of free television, it is merely a reaffirmation of prior law. 258 Sony is,
however, a multi-faceted decision. It touches upon and shapes three distinct areas of copyright law: the doctrine of fair use, liability for contributory infringement, and commercially-sponsored broadcast
television.
First and foremost, Sony is a fair use case. As such, the majority, by
concentrating its analysis on the issue of contributory infringement, may
be excused for carefully circumscribing a doctrine which has been described as the most difficult in the law of copyright. 25 9 As the dissent
indicated, however, the majority's comparatively cursory examination
of the fair use issue does not diminish that issue's importance to the
Court's final decision. 26 At its most basic level, Sony is a question of the
balance between monopoly and access that is at the core of copyright
law. It is the doctrine of fair use which defines that balance in the
penumbras left undefined by the Copyright Act's scheme of exclusive
rights and specific exemptions.2 6 ' Sony is, after all, like fair use, a determination that access should be allowed where the letter of the law has
prescribed a monopoly.
The majority attempted in its opinion to minimize the fair use issue
26 2
by reversing the analytical framework adopted by the courts below.
Both the district court and the court of appeals had reasoned from exemption to fair use to contributory infringement. Justice Stevens began
instead with the issue of Sony's liability as a seller of a staple item of
commerce. 26 3 Unauthorized home copying as fair use, the majority asserted, is only one of at least two non-infringing uses of the Betamax,26 4
and, if the structure of the opinion is telling, perhaps the least significant. The Court placed much greater emphasis on authorized recording. As the dissent correctly pointed out, however, the actual percentage
of authorized versus unauthorized recording was not revealed in the record before the Court. 26 5 If the majority decision is to withstand scrutiny, its twin rationale must stand not as cumulative factors but as
independent and severable elements. With the substantiality of authorized copying at best a question mark, fair use-the factor not dependent
on the consent of the copyright holder-looms much larger.
In discussing the extent of authorized copying, the majority stressed
258
259

Se infra text accompanying notes 294 & 295.
See supra notes 69 & 193.

See Sony, 104 S. Ct. at 815 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
Se supra notes 93-97 and accompanying text.
262 See supra note 193.
263 See supra note 148 & 198 and accompanying text.
264 See supra text accompanying notes 212-17.
265 See Sony, 104 S. Ct. at 814-15 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
260
261
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that the respondents represented only a small portion of television programmers. As a fair use case, the relevant inquiry in Sony should not
have been what market share Universal and Disney command but
rather whether they exemplify software producers that (1) comprise a
significant, or the major, percentage of producers supplying copyrighted
materials to television, and (2) produce software whose marketability is
especially vulnerable to copying. In the words of Justice Blackmun,
"[t]he amount of infringing use must be determined through consideration of the television market as a whole. ' 266 It is only upon investigation
of the scope of television programming in all its diversity that the value
of the Betamax as an item of social utility becomes evident.26 7 The statutory fair use test is comprehensive enough to encompass that inquiry.
Two of the statutory factors that Federal courts are directed to consider in fair use cases are the nature of the copyrighted materials and the
effect of copying on their marketability.2 68 Utilizing those criteria, an
examination of the content of television reveals that most television programming is of a type whose marketability is unaffected by home recording. Television programming may be divided into two categories or
types: disposable software and marketable software. 269 The primary
distinction between the two involves what Justice Stevens calls a copy266 Id.at 815 n.44 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
267 See generally NETWORK TELEVISION AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST (M. Botein & D.
Rice ed. 1980).
268 See supra note 94.
269 The author of this comment has chosen to refer to the content of television broadcast as "software" as opposed to the more commonly used term "programming." This
decision was based upon the perception that the Betamax-as well as personal computers and videodiscs--have transformed the television user from a passive into an active participant in the process of conveying information. Cf Fortnightly, 392 U.S. at 38990. The Sony Corporation has adopted this approach in its promotional campaign:
Once upon a time, there was no such thing as Betamax. Electronic
entertainment came into your home in two very different ways. You could
listen. Or you could watch. And when you stop to consider which was the
more satisfactory experience, there is really no comparison.
The audio world was an attive world. Tens of thousand of LP records
and tapes to choose from, so you could hear exactly what you wantedwhen you wanted it. Sophisticated technology at your fingertips, to
reproduce your music with exacting fidelity. Hi-fi cassette decks, for making
your own tapes, and portable recorders, to take your music with you wherever you walk, jog, or run. And all across the country, FM and AM broadcasts in every conceivable listening format-so you could always fine-tune
your choice of stations to suit your taste and mood.
But the video world was a passive world.
Three big national broadcasting networks, locked in fierce commercial
competition. A few independent stations struggling to keep up. One non-
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righted work's "potential secondary market."2 7
Disposable software has little or no potential secondary market; but
where it does, its value may be protected either by advertising revenue
or delivery by a more restrictive means. 271 Some examples of disposable
software include sports, news, situation comedies, popular melodrama
(soap operas), educational materials, game shows, and other forms of
light entertainment. Disposable software has certain indentifiable characteristics. First, it is time-sensitive.2 72 For example, the Super Bowl
generates tremendous interest, and is thus very valuable as television
programming for a short time before and after the actual event. Similarly, popular soap opera episodes may command the short-term interest
of a large segment of society. Nevertheless, the transient and fickle nature of popular culture renders videotape copies of those programs virtually worthless weeks, or even days, later.27 3 Thus, for most disposable
software the potential secondary market is severely limited both by time
and the nature of the copyrighted material.
Further, disposable software will be produced irrespective of its future copyrighted value beyond its initial exposure. The purpose of the
statutory monopoly is to provide the incentive for authors and artists to
create.274 If television programmers will produce copyrightable materials for reasons other than future marketability, it is not clear what society gains by extending the copyright monopoly beyond the material's
initial release. 275 A large segment of broadcasting today is sufficiently
financed by advertising revenue 2 7 6 or by other sources. Sports programcommercial public broadcasting channel. Maybe some local UHF stations,
or even a fledgling cable TV service.
All serving you on fixed broadcasting schedules, to suit themselves-not
you.
In the passive world of video, your action was limited to this: turning
on your TV, and twirling the dial.
What you saw, unfortunately, was what you got.
INSIDE GUIDE, supra note 7, at 2.
270 See Sony, 104 S.Ct. at 795 n.40.
271 See infra note 291 and accompaning text.
272 It is inherent in the nature of some things to be useful at one moment and useless
the next. "The peculiar value of news is in the spreading of it while it is fresh." International News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 235 (1918).
273 The videogame is another example of the mercurial marketability of popular
products. See Atari, Inc. v. North Am. Philips Consumer Elec. Corp., 672 F.2d 607 (7th
Cir. 1982).
274 See supra text accompanying notes 34-36.
275 Chafee, supra note 74, at 506-07.
276 Universal City Studios v. Sony Corp. II, 480 F. Supp. 429, 453 (C.D. Cal. 1979),
rev'd, 659 F.2d 963 (9th Cir. 1981), rev'd, 104 S.Ct. 774, reh'g dented, 104 S.Ct. 1619
(1984); Geller, Video Developments.- A Regulator Viewpoint 1-2, in THE LAWYER AND THE
NEW VIDEO MARKETPLACE II (ABA Forum on Communications Law 1983). But cf
Home Recording Hean'ngs, supra note 195, at 122-23 (testimony of Jay Eliasberg, former
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ming, for example, will be produced for gate receipts and broadcast
rights. News and talk shows will be produced in the public interest or
for the prestige and credibility they bring to a station or network. Soap
operas are the kind of light entertainment whose relatively low budget is
adequately, and often handsomely, supported by advertising. In general, the definition of incentive and its role in defining the scope of copyright protection is a function of the economic system that developed to
distribute the proceeds of copyright proprietorship. 277 Economic incentive in the classical copyright world of the bookseller means something
quite different in a world of live spectacle, advertising, and free
broadcast.
Not all television programming is disposable in the sense that it
lacks marketability. Disposable software is contradistinguished from
marketable software.2 7 ' The latter category, which includes featurelength movies, dramatic works, filmed versions of legitimate theater,
concerts, and musicals, are less time-sensitive than disposable software.
Moreover, those and similarly expensive, elaborate, or serious productions have market life over time and through various media. Works of
that type remain in demand because the consuming public recognizes
them as important contributions to our culture. Of course, public demand will fluctuate, often inversely to a work's contribution to society.
Although the marketability of marketable software will vary and may
eventually be exhausted before the copyright term ends, it nevertheless
has exploitable value after an initial release or broadcast.
Since those works are potentially highly marketable, they are most
vulnerable to copyright infringement. Thus, as a matter of fair use law,
unauthorized access to marketable software is precluded by the fourth
Vice President of Research, CBS Broadcast Group) (VCR will result in decline of reported audience size, thus decreasing revenues from advertisers).
277 Gordon, supra note 35, at 1604.
278 Not all programming falls squarely in either the disposable or marketable category. Some news broadcasts, for example, may have secondary market value for historical reasons. Access to these materials, however, may be allowed on first amendment
grounds or by the traditional application of fair use. Some initially disposable materials
may later become marketable as curiosities or evocators of nostalgia. These materials
may still be commercially exploited by the sale of "Highlights" or "Best of" compilations sold inexpensively enough, and packaged cleverly enough, to supplant home-made
versions. As for reruns, the district court made clear that the Betamax may increase
rather than decrease syndication values by increasing the original audience size. Home
Recording Hearings, supra note 195, at 217. Moreover, to the extent the public is aware of
future broadcasts, Betamax copying may be bypassed in lieu of later free viewings.
While most news programming will fall squarely into the category of disposable
software, certain specialized programming masquerading as news will command limited
market value. See Pacific and S. Co. v. Duncan, 572 F. Supp. 1186 (N.D. Ga. 1983)
("hard" v. "soft" news).
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fair use factor.2 79 As a matter of general copyright law, uncompensated
access to marketable software removes or diminishes the economic incentive to create. Unlike disposable software, which is financed by other
sources or for other reasons, the production of marketable software will
attract large amounts of time, talent, creative energy, and most importantly, money, only when the potential exists for significant monetary
return. 2 01 Of course, some artists will produce works for egotistical, altruistic, or cathartic reasons alone. Nevertheless, while one man might
produce an epic drama, it is the safe haven of copyright protection in a
capitalist system that inspires its mass publication.8 1
Succinctly, disposable software does not warrant copyright protection beyond initial exposure because (1) it already receives a fair return
on investment, and (2) it has little or no secondary market.28 2 Moreover, in the case of news or other informational programming, access
without compensation may further first amendment values.28 3 In either
case, disposable software, which constitutes the bulk of television programming, is properly appropriated by fair use.
Marketable software, on the other hand, should be disseminated in
a manner that guarantees the highest return on investment. Normally,
more restrictive means such as theater exhibitions and pay-per-view
broadcast should be employed first. 28 4 Free public television should be
supra note 94 and accompanying text.
Baumgarten, supra note 74, at 10.
281 See Chafee, supra note 74, at 508.
282 Market value is not a prerequisite to copyright protection; the only requirement is
fixation in a tangible medium. Se supra note 32. Nevertheless, market value may be a
factor in determining the scope of access to copyrighted materials. In cases of market
failure as in cases of disposable software, fair use will permit unauthorized access. See
Gordon, supra note 35, at 1614-15. Where the copyrighted work has remaining marketability, absent a strong public interest factor, access may be denied.
It has been held that copyright grants an author the right to limit, or cut off completely, access to his work. Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932). However, an artist who produces intellectual property of value to society and then denies the
public access for the statutory term frustrates the essential purpose of the copyright
scheme-the wide dissemination of art, ideas, culture, and information. A copyright
holder should be free to choose to whom to sell and at what price, but not be free to
unreasonably deny access altogether. "Outright copying is often a civilizing rather than
a cannibalizing folkway. The world would be a duller place without the originators, but
it would not work without the copyists." B.H. Bunn Co. v. AAA Replacement Parts
Co., 451 F.2d 1254, 1259 (5th Cir. 1971).
283 See supra notes 67 & 179 and accompanying text.
284 See Comment, supra note 9, at 617 ("capacity to tape off the air... may affect the
particular format in which copyright owners choose to mass market their products"); see
also Home Recording Hearings,supra note 195, at 219-20 (testimony of Jack Wayman, Senior Vice President, Consumer Electronics Group, Electronic Industries Association)
(movie picture companies "quadruple dippers in economic pot": theatre runs, pre-recorded cassettes, cable/pay television, and free television).
279 See
280 See
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the last stop in the market scheme, and, then, only when advertising
revenues or broadcast rights meet or exceed the work's remaining market value.
While it has an interest in works that may best be described as disposable, Universal's primary concern is protecting the future value of its
marketable software. That is a laudable goal and one deserving of copyright protection. Universal and Disney are the kind of firm that invests
the talent and resources needed in order to produce works of enduring
value, the underlying purpose of copyright. Free television may simply
be the least suitable medium for initial exposure.
The advantage in analyzing the fair use issue in Sony by formulating a disposable/marketable dichotomy as opposed to the authorized/unauthorized time-shifting dichotomy adopted by Justice Stevens's
majority opinion is two-fold. First, an objective evaluation of all television programming obviates the need for the subjective determination of
the percentage of unauthorized versus authorized recording urged by
Justice Blackmun in his dissent. Under the disposable/marketable
dichotomy, a copyright proprietor is simply precluded from refusing to
allow the copying of disposable works. Second, the disposable/marketable dichotomy is a more realistic appraisal of television programming.
In contending that Betamax owners record mostly entertainment, Justice Blackmun failed to recognize that most of what passes as television
entertainment is, in fact, disposable software.
When the free television marketplace is viewed as being dominated
by disposable software, the impropriety of the Universal suit as one for
contributory infringement becomes manifest. Universal's attempt to use
its copyright monopoly against Sony is unjustified for two reasons. First,
in seeking either an injunction against the sale of VTRs or the creation
of a compulsory royalty, Universal sought to impose too great a burden
on the first amendment rights of both acquiesing broadcasters of disposable software and receivers. 28 5 Receivers have a first amendment right
to receive what producers of disposable software wish to send them.286
The remedy of an injunction prohibiting the sale of Betamaxes would
285 This argument assumes that the owner of the disposable copyrighted work expressly or implicitly authorizes copying. This may occur wherever a copyright proprietor seeks to increase audience size or realizes the unmarketability of its property.
The first amendment rights of a willing or acquiescing sender and willing receiver
should be distinguished from the first amendment right advanced either as a component
of a fair use defense or as a separate defense to copyright infringement. See supra notes
57 & 67 and accompanying text. The latter involve the dichotomy between ideas and
expression and are marked by a distinctly unwilling sender.
286 Freedom of speech necessarily includes both the right to send and the right to

receive information. Se, e.g., Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390-93
(1969) (right of public to receive ideas); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969)
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preclude time-shifting, which in some instances facilitates that communication. Moreover, a compulsory royalty unreasonably increases the
cost of that communication although broadcasters and receivers neither
28 7
hinder the rights of others nor directly benefit from the tax.
Second, the creation of an interest in a machine, either by injunction or by royalty, allows the use of copyright to intrude on the legal
relationships controlled by patent law. A compulsory royalty system
that fails to distinguish accurately between disposable and marketable
software confers a windfall on the producers of even the most useless
materials. Since copyright protection extends beyond the period of patent protection 288 and copyrighted materials are constantly being created, new and useful copying technologies would be constantly
burdened by a multitude of valid copyrights irrespective of the amount
of infringing versus non-infringing use. Thus, advances in technology,
unburdened by patent protection after the term had expired, could not
be delivered to the public at the unpatented price because of the cost of
continuing copyright royalties.
Recognition of the heterogeneous character of television programming also sheds light on Justice Stevens's decision to adjudge Sony's
contributory infringement liability by analogy to patent law. In patent
law an attempt to expand improperly the monopoly is termed "patent
misuse. "289 The doctrine includes the concept that as the definition of
patent misuse expands, the right to bring an action for contributory infringement contracts. That is, the right to bring an action for contributory infringement ceases when the patent owner attempts to use his
monopoly in a manner beyond the scope of the statutory grant. In patent law, by congressional fiat, the monopoly ends when it encumbers the
use of staple goods.
The Sony Court's adoption of a narrow test for contributory liability
indicates that it viewed Universal's suit as an attempt at "copyright misuse." As Congress has done in patent law, the majority ended the copyright monopoly at the point where it impacted adversely on societal
goals of equal or greater value. While Universal could always bring an
action for direct infringement against an individual Betamax owner, its
(right to receive information fundamental to free society); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479, 482 (1965) (freedom of speech includes right to distribute and right to receive).
287 But see Note, The Betamax Case: Accomodating Pubic Access and Economic Incentive in

Copyright Law, 31 STAN L. REV. 243, 262 (1979) (minimal restriction on access imposed
by royalty outweighed by maintenance of copyright incentive mechanism).
288 Compare 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1982) (seventeen year patent term) with 17 U.S.C. § 302
(1982) (copyright for works created after Jan. 1, 1978, endures for life of author plus fifty

years).
289

See supra notes 149-57 and accompanying text.
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right to bring an action for contributory infringement was dependent
upon an analysis of the usefulness of the Betamax in the process of television broadcasting as a whole.
As Justice Stevens noted, the "wasteland" of television broadcasting" is comprised of more than Universal and Disney products-the
landscape of free broadcast television includes a plethora of programming available either through the intent or acquiesence of the sender or
by appropriation through fair use.2 9 It is that wide availability of disposable software that renders the Betamax a valuable contribution to
the dissemination of broadcasted materials.
The strong public interest in the availability of disposable software
further renders the traditional contributory infringement cases of Kalem
and Gershwin inapposite. In neither of those cases did the plaintiff attempt to use its copyright to interfere with the copyright or similar legal
right of another.29 2 The defendant in Kalem could not have argued that
the public was entitled to an unauthorized film version of Ben Hur; similarly, the concert-goers in Gershwtn did not have an independent interest
in hearing the publisher's songs. Sony did not, as Justice Blackmun contended, distort the existing law of contributory infringement for the simple reason that the case was one of first impression-never before had an
290 See N.Y. Times, Jan. 14, 1962, § VI, at 14.

See supra text accompanying notes 209-11.
Much of the controversy in Sony centered upon which test for contributory infringement would be used to judge Sony's liability. Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, chose ultimately to use, by analogy, a test for contributory infringement from
patent law. See Sony, 104 S. Ct. at 787-88.
Justice Blackmun, in dissent, argued for the use of a test common to trademark law
that has, in the past, been used in copyright law. See Sony, 104 S. Ct. at 813 (Blackmun,
J., dissenting). The following indicates that the patent law test was the more logical
solution.
The models below represent various contributory infringement actions.
291

292

Model 1.

Contributory Infringement in Trademark

In this model, P is a seller of a low-cost cola, K. C sells a brand-name cola. Co, the
consumer, enters R's restaurant and orders C's product by name. Instead R serves Co
P's product because P's sales representative has convinced R that "P's cola is as good as
C's at half the price and no one will know the difference." P is potentially liable as a
contributory infringer because he has caused or "induced" R's substitution. See, e.g.,
Coca-Cola Co. v. Snow Crest Beverages, 64 F. Supp. 980, 989 (D. Mass. 1946), af'd, 162
F.2d 280 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 809, reh'g dented, 332 U.S. 832 (1947).
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owner of copyrights attempted to misuse its limited monopoly by suing
the manufacturer of technology so useful for non-infringing

Model 2.

Contributory Infringement in Copyright

M
L

In this model, M organizes concerts in order for A to play music to L. A, the artist,
plays G's songs to L, the listener, without paying G the royalty his copyright entitles him
to. Since M arranged the event and profited from it, M has "materially contributed to"
or "induced" A's infringement. See Gershwin Publishing Corp. v. Columbia Artists
Management, Inc., 443 F.2d 1159 (2d Cir. 1971).
Model 3.

Contributory Infringement in Patent

In this model, both RH and DC desire to sell P, an unpatented, non-staple chemical to F, the farmer. RH has a patent for a process involving the use of P. According to
statute, RH's ability to control the sale of P will depend upon whether P is a staple or
non-staple. Staples, capable of diverse use, should not be subject to monopoly as a matter of public policy. Since P is only useful to society in RH's process, RH may control its
sale. See Dawson Chem. Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176 (1980).
Model 4.

Sony

In this model, GH produces and broadcasts DS, disposable software, to TV, a television viewer. UD produces and broadcasts MS, marketable software, also to TV. S
sells B, the Betamax, to TV who places it in line to receive broadcasted signals.
Justice Blackmun, dissenting in Sony, would have applied Model I to the fact pattern of Model 4 in order to determine Sony's liability. See Sony, 104 S. Ct. at 811-15. Use
of the Model 1 test in Sony would have been illogical and unjust for the following reasons.
While it is safe to analogize from Model 1 to Model 2, as the court in Gershwtn
implicitly did, analogizing from Model 1 to Model 4 ignores important factual differences between the two cases. Model 1 may be reformulated to conform to Model 2,
without doing violence to the accepted facts, in the following manner:
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Model 1(a)

Model 2
M

Qp

L

Co

In Model 1(a), P induces R, the restaurant owner, to sell P's cola to the consumer in
the same way M induces their artists to play G's songs without paying a royalty. In each
case a fourth party, C and G, has a legal interest to protect. In Model 1(a), C has an
economic interest, protected by law, in preventing R from selling P's cola when a consumer has requested C's product. Likewise, G has an economic interest in receiving
royalties when its songs are played publicly, especially since the playing itself evidences
public demand for them.
The public policy underlying each case is, however, different. In Model 1, the
interest is in preventing the tort of "passing off," or consumer fraud; in Model 2, the
danger is collapse of the copyright scheme because of a failure to provide artists with
economic rewards. Nevertheless, in either case, a fourth party has a protectable interest
and an important public policy is enforced. The analogy, although imperfect, is defensible.
Note, however, that in Model 1, C does not have the right to prevent P from selling
cola altogether-only the right to prevent P and R from defrauding the public. Note
also that while G in Model 2 can control the public performance of its copyrighted
works or receive a royalty, G does not have the power to prevent the playing of songs in
which G has no interest.
In contrast, Model 1 cannot be used neatly to analyze Model 4. Justice Blackmun
appears to argue that following Model 2, Model I may be rewritten as follows:
Model 4(a)

A

TV
B&
UD

A = all of television
programming = disposable and
marketable software.

This analogy is illogical because it assumes that UD has a legal right to control the
videotaping of all television to the same extent that G, in model 2, has a right to control
the playing of only its songs. Thus, the above model misses half the picture; Model 2
revised to conform to the components of Model 4 must be written as follows, in two
parts:
Model 4(b)

Model 4(c)

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 15:52

endeavors.2 9 3
The Betamax is at the receiving end of a special relationship between the broadcaster and the receiving public. It is fitting, then, that
Justice Stevens, in his majority opinion in Sony, should quote Justice
Stewart for the proposition that the public is the intended beneficiary of
the copyright system.29 4 Justice Stewart's opinions in Fortnightly and
Aiken firmly established the public right to receive and to put to reasonable use the free broadcast signal. It must be remembered that free
broadcast is financed extensively by advertising, a cost every consumer
shares; and that Sony was not a question of whether producers would be
paid, but rather simply how much.
Finally, until and unless we change our perception of copyright
from a statutory right to a natural right we must be satisfied with a
statute whose application is constantly thrown in doubt by new technolHere, while UD has a legal interest in the relationship presented in Model 4(b), i.e.,
the right to control the videotaping of marketable software, it has no recognizable interest in the recording of disposable software from free broadcast.
Reformulating Model 3 to conform to Model 2 reveals a similar dichotomy. In
order to include all relevant relationships, Model 3 must, like Model 4, be reconceived in
two parts as follows:
Model 3(b)
non-staple

Model 3(a)
staple
RH

RH

Here, if P is a staple item of commerce, then RH may "induce" F to purchase it
from him without infringing upon any of DC's legal rights. If P is a non-staple, then
RH may not induce F to purchase it from anyone but DC. Similarly, if the Betamax is a
staple item, then Sony may "induce" TV to purchase it for the non-infringing act of
videotaping disposable software. UD may not utilize its monopoly to affect a relationship prote ted by the public policy to encourage the free flow of commerce.
Thus, Model 3 and Model 4 are logically consistent; both reflect a dichotomous
situation. Note, too, that in neither case does the tort of "passing off," or similar fraud so
fundamental to Model 1, occur. Justice Stevens's analogy to patent law was, therefore,
the correct choice.
293 See Sony, 104 S. Ct. at 778 (["Universal's] unprecedented attempt to impose copyright liability upon . . . distributors of copying equipment").
294 Justice Stewart wrote:
Creative work is to be encouraged and rewarded, but private motivation
must ultimately serve the cause of promoting broad public availability of
literature, music, and the other arts. The immediate effect of our copyright
law is to secure a fair return for an 'author's' creative labor. But the ultimate aim is, by this incentive, to stimulate artistic creativity for the general
public good.
Id. at 783 (quoting Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1974)).
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ogy. 295 As an example of judges making the kind of decision that is
customarily made through the checks and balances of the legislative
process, Sony has been and will continue to be a controversial decision.
Whatever virtues an equitable rule of reason may have, it lacks the democratic appeal and certainty of a legislature's enactments; while equity
may rule the day, ordered society requires the predictability of settled
law.296
Thus, the Copyright Act's delegation of a legislative function
through the device of the fair use doctrine is a less than satisfying reconciliation of conflicting values. It is, nevertheless, in a complicated world,
indistinguishable from the disputes between public policy and private
right we place in the public law everyday. In the absence of clear congressional directives, it is enough that the decision is rational and essentially fair.
Noel Lawrence Hillman
Theoretically, new technology
if the right of exploitation and
protection
of
copyright
scope
on
the
no
effect
have
should
control springs forth with the creation of the work itself; the method of dissemination
becomes irrelevant.
296
1. Equity in Law is ye same yt ye spirit is in Religion, what ever 3 one
pleases to make it. Some times they Goe according to conscience some time
according to Law some time according to ye Rule (a) of y Court.
2. Equity is A Roguish thing, for Law wee have a measure know what
to trust too. Equity is according to ye conscience of him yt is Chancellor, and
as y, is larger or narrower soe is equity Tis all one as if they should make ye
4
Standard for ye measure wee call A foot, to be ye Chancellors foot; what an
uncertain measure would this be; One Chancellor ha's a long foot another A
short foot a third an indifferent foot; tis ye same thing in ye Chancellors
ConscienZe (b).
295 See supra notes 31 & 32 and accompanying text.
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43 (F. Pollack ed. 1927).

